And when we come to a comparison between different stages in the development of the same race， between ourselves， for instance， and the Teutonic tribes of the time of Caesar， the difference is neither in human nature nor in capacity， but in organization， in the range and complexity of relations， in the diverse expression of powers and passions essentially much the same.
There is no better proof of this generic likeness of human nature than in the ease and joy with which the modern man makes himself at home in literature depicting the most remote and varied phases of life梚n Homer， in the Nibelung tales， in the Hebrew Scriptures， in the legends of the American Indians， in stories of frontier life， of soldiers and sailors， of criminals and tramps， and so on. The more penetratingly any phase of human life is studied the more an essential likeness to ourselves is revealed.
To return to primary groups： the view here maintained is that human nature is not something existing separately in the individual， but a group-nature or primary phase of society， a relatively simple and general condition (30) of the social mind. It is something more， on the one hand， than the mere instinct that is born in us梩hough that enters into it梐nd something less， on the other， than the more elaborate development of ideas and sentiments that makes up institutions. lt is the nature which is developed and expressed in those simple， face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies； groups of the family， the playground， and the neighborhood. In the essential similarity of these is to be found the basis， in experience， for similar ideas and sentiments in the human mind. In these， everywhere， human nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth； he cannot acquire it except through fellowship， and it decays in isolation.
If this view does not recommend itself to commonsense I do not know that elaboration will be of much avail. It simply means the application at this point of the idea that society and individuals are inseparable phases of a common whole， so that wherever we find an individual fact we may look for a social fact to go with it. If there is a universal nature in persons there must be something universal in association to correspond to it.
What else can human nature be than a trait of primary groups ？ Surely not an attribute of the separate individual梥upposing there were any such thing梥ince its typical characteristics， such as affection， ambition， vanity， and resentment， are inconceivable apart from society.
If it belongs， then， to man in association， what kind or degree of association is required to develop it ？ Evidently nothing elaborate， because elaborate phases of society are transient and diverse， while human nature is compara-(31)-tively stable and universal. In short the family and neighborhood life is essential to its genesis and nothing more is.
Here as everywhere in the study of society we must learn to see mankind in psychical wholes， rather than in artificial separation.
We must see and feel the communal life of family and local groups as immediate facts， not as combinations of something else. And perhaps we shall do this best by recalling our own experience and extending it through sympathetic observation. What， in our life， is the family and the fellowship； what do we know of the we-feeling？ Thought of this kind may help us to get a concrete perception of that primary group-nature of which everything social is the outgrowth.
EndnotesThe History of Human Marriage. A History of Matrimonial Institutions. Newer Ideals of Peace， 177. De Tocqueville， Democracy in America， vol. i， chap. 5. These matters are expounded at some length in the writer's Human Nature and the Social Order. The Native Tribes of Central Australia. Compare also Darwin's views and examples given in chap. 7 of his Descent of Man.
