It matters little for these larger purposes whether the sins or virtues of conspicuous persons are conscious or not; our concern is with what they stand for in the general mind.In fact conscious wickedness is comparatively unimportant, because it implies that the individual is divided in his own mind, and therefore weak.The most effective ill-doers believe in themselves and have a quiet conscience.And, in the same way, goodness is most effectual when it takes itself as a matter of course and feels no self-complacency.
Blame and punishment, then, are essentially symbolic, their function being to define and enforce the public will, and in no way imply that the offenders are of a different nature from the rest of us.
We feel it to be true that with a little different training and surroundings we might have committed almost any crime for which men are sent to prison, and can readily understand that criminals should not commonly feel that they are worse than others.The same principle applies to those malefactors, more dangerous pcrhups, who keep within the law, and yet arc terribly punished from time to time by public opinion.
Perhaps it would be well if both those who suffer punishment and those who inflict it were more distinctly aware of its symbolic character and function.The former might find their sense of justice appeased by perceiving that though what they did was natural and perhaps not consciously wrong, it may still need to be discredited and atoned for.The culprit is not separated from society by his punishment, but restored to it.It is his way of service; and if he takes it in the right spirit he is better off than those who do wrong but are not punished.
The rest of us, on the other hand, might realize that those in the pillory are our representatives, who suffer, in a real sense, for us.This would disincline us to spend in a cheap abuse of conspicuous offenders that moral ardor whose proper function is the correction of our own life.The spectacle of punishment is not for us to gloat over, but to remind us of our sins, which, as springing from the same nature and society, are sure to be much the same as that of the one punished.It is precisely because he is like us that he is punished.If he were radically different he would belong in an insane asylum, and punishment would be mere cruelty.
Under the larger view of mind responsibility is broadened, because we recognize a broader reach of causation, but by no means lost in an abstract "society." It goes with power and increases rapidly in proportion as the evil comes nearer the sphere of the individual's voluntary action, so that each of us is peculiarly responsible for the moral state of his own trade, family, or social connection.Contrary to a prevalent impression, it is in these familiar relations that the individual is least of all justified in being no better than his environment.
Every act of the will, especially where the will is most at home, should be affirmative and constructive; it being the function and meaning of individuality that each one should be, in the direction of his chief activities, something other and better than his surroundings.
Once admit the plea " I may do what other people do," and the basis of righteousness is gone; perhaps there is no moral fallacy so widespread and so pernicious as this.It is these no-worse-than-other-people decisions that paralyze the moral life in the one and in the whole, involving a sort of moral panmixia, as the biologists say, which, lacking any progressive impulse, must result in deterioration.In the end it will justify anything, since there are always bad examples to fall back upon.
It is commonly futile, however, to require any sharp break with the past; we must be content with an upward endeavor and tendency.
It is quite true that we are all involved in a net of questionable practices from which we can only escape a little at a time and in cooperation with our associates.
It is an error to imagine that the doctrine of individual responsibility is always the expedient and edifying one in matters of conduct.There is a sort of people who grow indignant whenever general causes are insisted upon, apparently convinced that whether these are real or not it is immoral to believe in them.But it is not invariably a good thing to urge the will, since this, if overstimulated, becomes fagged, stale, and discouraged.
Often it is better that one should let himself go, and trust himself to the involuntary forces, to the nature of things, to God.The nervous or strained person only harasses and weakens his will by fixing attention upon it: it will work on more effectually if he looks away from it, calming himself by a view of the larger whole; and not without reason Spinoza counts among the advantages of determinism " the attainment of happiness by man through realizing his intimate union with the whole nature of things; the distinction between things in our power and things not in our power; the avoidance of all disturbing passions, and the performance of social duties from rational desire for the common good."
