Qu. 42. Whether men may not reason in species as well as in words? Whether the same rules of logic do not obtain in both cases? And whether we have not a right to expect and demand the same evidence in both?
Qu. 43. Whether an algebraist, fluxionist, geometrician, or demonstrator of any kind can expect indulgence for obscure principles or incorrect reasonings? And whether an algebraical note or species can at the end of a process be interpreted in a sense which could not have been substituted for it at the beginning? Or whether any particular supposition can come under a general case which doth not consist with the reasoning thereof?
Qu. 44. Whether the difference between a mere computer and a man of science be not, that the one computes on principles clearly conceived, and by rules evidently demonstrated, whereas the other doth not?
Qu. 45. Whether, although geometry be a science, and algebra allowed to be a science, and the analytical a most excellent method, in the application, nevertheless, of the analysis to geometry, men may not have admitted false principles and wrong methods of reasoning?
Qu. 46. Whether, although algebraical reasonings are admitted to be ever so just, when confined to signs or species as general representatives of quantity, you may not nevertheless fall into error, if, when you limit them to stand for particular things, you do not limit yourself to reason consistently with the nature of such particular things?
And whether such error ought to be imputed to pure algebra?
Qu. 47. Whether the view of modern mathematicians doth not rather seem to be the coming at an expression by artifice, than at the coming at science by demonstration?
Qu. 48. Whether there may not be sound metaphysics as well as unsound? Sound as well as unsound logic? And whether the modern analytics may not be brought under one of these denominations, and which?
Qu. 49. Whether there be not really a philosophia prima , a certain transcendental science superior to and more extensive than mathematics, which it might behove our modern analysts rather to learn than despise?
Qu. 50. Whether, ever since the recovery of mathematical learning, there have not been perpetual disputes and controversies among the mathematicians? And whether this doth not disparage the evidence of their methods?
Qu. 51. Whether anything but metaphysics and logic can open the eyes of mathematicians and extricate them out of their difficulties?
Qu. 52. Whether, upon the received principles, a quantity can by any division or subdivision, though carried ever so far, be reduced to nothing?
Qu. 53. Whether, if the end of geometry be practice, and this practice be measuring, and we measure only assignable extensions, it will not follow that unlimited approximations completely answer the intention of geometry?
Qu. 54. Whether the same things which are now done by infinites may not be done by finite quantities? And whether this would not be a great relief to the imaginations and understandings of mathematical men?
Qu. 55. Whether those philomathematical physicians, anatomists, and dealers in the animal economy, who admit the doctrine of fluxions with an implicit faith, can with a good grace insult other men for believing what they do not comprehend?
Qu. 56. Whether the corpuscularian, experimental, and mathematical philosophy, so much cultivated in the last age, hath not too much engrossed men's attention; some part whereof it might have usefully employed?
Qu. 57. Whether, from this and other concurring causes, the minds of speculative men have not been borne downward, to the debasing and stupifying of the higher faculties? And whether we may not hence account for that prevailing narrowness and bigotry among many who pass for men of science, their incapacity for things moral, intellectual, or theological, their proneness to measure all truths by sense and experience of animal life?
Qu. 58. Whether it be really an effect of thinking, that the same men admire the great author for his fluxions, and deride him for his religion?
Qu. 59. If certain philosophical virtuosi of the present age have no religion, whether it can be said to be want of faith?
Qu. 60. Whether it be not a juster way of reasoning, to recommend points of faith from their effects, than to demonstrate mathematical principles by their conclusions?
Qu. 61. Whether it be not less exceptionable to admit points above reason than contrary to reason?
Qu. 62. Whether mysteries may not with better right be allowed of in Divine Faith than in human science?
Qu. 63. Whether such mathematicians as cry out against mysteries have ever examined their own principles?
Qu. 64. Whether mathematicians, who are so delicate in religious points, are strictly scrupulous in their own science?
Whether they do not submit to authority, take things upon trust, and believe points inconceivable? Whether they have not their mysteries, and what is more, their repugnances and contradictions?
Qu. 65. Whether it might not become men who are puzzled and perplexed about their own principles, to judge warily, candidly, and modestly concerning other matters?
Qu. 66. Whether the modern analytics do not furnish a strong argumentum ad hominem against the philomathematical infidels of these times?
Qu. 67. Whether it follows from the above-mentioned remarks, that accurate and just reasoning is the peculiar character of the present age? And whether the modern growth of infidelity can be ascribed to a distinction so truly valuable?
