SOCRATES:And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre,the flute and all other things?
HIPPIAS:Very true.
SOCRATES:And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you may ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily?
HIPPIAS:I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily.
SOCRATES:That would be the better horse?
HIPPIAS:Yes.
SOCRATES:Then with a horse of better temper,vicious actions would be produced voluntarily;and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily?
HIPPIAS:Certainly.
SOCRATES:And that would be true of a dog,or of any other animal?
HIPPIAS:Yes.
SOCRATES:And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark?
HIPPIAS:Of him who voluntarily misses.
SOCRATES:This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery?
HIPPIAS:Yes.
SOCRATES:Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind which errs voluntarily?
HIPPIAS:Yes,certainly,in the use of the bow.
SOCRATES:And what would you say of the art of medicine;--has not the mind which voluntarily works harm to the body,more of the healing art?
HIPPIAS:Yes.
SOCRATES:Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the involuntary?
HIPPIAS:Yes.
SOCRATES:Well,and in lute-playing and in flute-playing,and in all arts and sciences,is not that mind the better which voluntarily does what is evil and dishonourable,and goes wrong,and is not the worse that which does so involuntarily?
HIPPIAS:That is evident.
SOCRATES:And what would you say of the characters of slaves?Should we not prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes,and are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit them involuntarily?
HIPPIAS:Yes.
SOCRATES:And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best state possible?
HIPPIAS:Yes.
SOCRATES:And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make mistakes voluntarily or involuntarily?
HIPPIAS:O,Socrates,it would be a monstrous thing to say that those who do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wrong involuntarily!
SOCRATES:And yet that appears to be the only inference.
HIPPIAS:I do not think so.
SOCRATES:But I imagined,Hippias,that you did.Please to answer once more:Is not justice a power,or knowledge,or both?Must not justice,at all events,be one of these?
HIPPIAS:Yes.
SOCRATES:But if justice is a power of the soul,then the soul which has the greater power is also the more just;for that which has the greater power,my good friend,has been proved by us to be the better.
HIPPIAS:Yes,that has been proved.
SOCRATES:And if justice is knowledge,then the wiser will be the juster soul,and the more ignorant the more unjust?
HIPPIAS:Yes.
SOCRATES:But if justice be power as well as knowledge--then will not the soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just,and that which is the more ignorant be the more unjust?Must it not be so?
HIPPIAS:Clearly.
SOCRATES:And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom also better,and better able to do both good and evil in every action?
HIPPIAS:Certainly.
SOCRATES:The soul,then,which acts ill,acts voluntarily by power and art--and these either one or both of them are elements of justice?
HIPPIAS:That seems to be true.
SOCRATES:And to do injustice is to do ill,and not to do injustice is to do well?
HIPPIAS:Yes.
SOCRATES:And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong,do wrong voluntarily,and the bad soul involuntarily?
HIPPIAS:Clearly.
SOCRATES:And the good man is he who has the good soul,and the bad man is he who has the bad?
HIPPIAS:Yes.
SOCRATES:Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong,and the bad man involuntarily,if the good man is he who has the good soul?
HIPPIAS:Which he certainly has.
SOCRATES:Then,Hippias,he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things,if there be such a man,will be the good man?
HIPPIAS:There I cannot agree with you.
SOCRATES:Nor can I agree with myself,Hippias;and yet that seems to be the conclusion which,as far as we can see at present,must follow from our argument.As I was saying before,I am all abroad,and being in perplexity am always changing my opinion.Now,that I or any ordinary man should wander in perplexity is not surprising;but if you wise men also wander,and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering,the matter begins to be serious both to us and to you.
