P/RIESTLEY speaking of "a set of pretended philosophers, of whom the most conspicuous and assuming is Reid," says of Oswald, that he wonders bow his ,performance should have excited any other feeling than that of contempt." 'As to Dr.Oswald, whom I have treated with the least ceremony, the disgust his writings gave me was so great, that I could not possibly show him more respect."("Examination of Dr.Reid's Inquiry.") Oswald's work is entitled " An Appeal to Common Sense in behalf of {230}
religion." The first volume appeared in 1766, and it reached a second edition in 1768.The second volume was published in 1772.He takes substantially the same line of defence as Reid; but the " Appeal " is less pointed, and is vastly looser than Reid's " Inquiry; " and one feels it a dreary task to go through its platitudes.He entrenches himself behind certain distinctions recognized in the age." The distinction between the occasion and cause of a thing is too considerable to be overlooked in a philosophical inquiry.
Sensation and reflection, do indeed give occasion to all our ideas, but do not therefore produce them.They may in our present state be considered as the <sine qua non> to our most rational and sublime conceptions, but are not therefore the powers by which we form them." He opposes Lord Kames, and blames him for resting morality on feeling, and Adam Smith for resting it on sympathy, whereas it should be represented as founded on common sense." Common sense perceives and pronounces upon all primary truths with the same indubitable certainty with which we perceive and pronounce on objects of sense by our bodily organs." " By the discernment peculiar to rational beings we perceive all primary truths, in the same manner as we perceive objects of sense by our bodily organs." " Primary truths of religion and morality are as much objects of common sense as other primary truths." In the advertisement to the second volume, be mentions that some think that this Appeal ought to have set out with a definition of common sense; and be goes on to show that he does not mean by it common opinion, just or unjust.He calls it the simple authority of reason, or that capacity of pronouncing on obvious truth." Reason requires our admitting primary truths on its authority, under the penalty of being convicted of folly and nonsense, if we do not." Oswald cannot be represented as grappling with the deeper problems of metaphysics, as, for example, with the question, whether the common sense is subjective or objective, or whether it is subjective in one sense, as it is in the mind, and objective in another sense, as the mind in many cases -- not all, however -- looks to external objects.He seems to me to be right when he combines two elements in moral apprehension: " we have a feeling, as well as perception, of moral excellence." Dr.Oswald was born in Dunnet became minister there (1727), and at Methven (1750), and died in 1793.
