第31章

Charles the Bald, Lewis, and Lothair were still theoretically --if it be proper to use the word -- Emperors of Rome. Just as theCaesars of the Eastern and Western Empires had each been de jureemperor of the whole world, with defacto control over half of it,so the three Carlovingians appear to have considered their poweras limited, but their title as unqualified. The same speculativeuniversality of sovereignty continued to be associated with theImperial throne after the second division on the death of Charlesthe Fat, and, indeed, was never thoroughly dissociated from it solong as the empire of Germany lasted. Territorial sovereignty --the view which connects sovereignty with the possession of alimited portion of the earth's surface -- was distinctly anoffshoot, though a tardy one, of feudalism. This might have beenexpected a priori, for it was feudalism which for the first timelinked personal duties, and by consequence personal rights, tothe ownership of land. Whatever be the proper view of its originand legal nature, the best mode of vividly picturing to ourselvesthe feudal organisation is to begin with the basis, to considerthe relation of the tenant to the patch of soil which created andlimited his services -- and then to mount up, through narrowingcircles of super-feudation, till we approximate to the apex ofthe system. Where that summit exactly was during the laterportion of the dark ages it is not easy to decide. Probably,wherever the conception of tribe sovereignty had really decayed,the topmost point was always assigned to the supposed successorof the Caesars of the West. But before long, when the actualsphere of Imperial authority had immensely contracted, and whenthe emperors had concentrated the scanty remains of their powerupon Germany and North Italy, the highest feudal superiors in allthe outlying portions of the former Carlovingian empire foundthemselves practically without a supreme head. Gradually theyhabituated themselves to the new situation, and the fact ofimmunity put at last out of sight the theory of dependence; butthere are many symptoms that this change was not quite easilyaccomplished; and, indeed, to the impression that in the natureof things there must necessarily be a culminating dominationsomewhere, we may, no doubt, refer the increasing tendency toattribute secular superiority to the See of Rome. The completionof the first stage in the revolution of opinion is marked, ofcourse, by the accession of the Capetian dynasty in France. Whenthe feudal prince of a limited territory surrounding Paris began,from the accident of his uniting an unusual number ofsuzerainties in his own person, to call himself King of France,he became king in quite a new sense, a sovereign standing in thesame relation to the soil of France as the baron to his estate,the tenant to his freehold. The precedent, however, was asinfluential as it was novel, and the form of the monarchy inFrance had visible effects in hastening changes which wereelsewhere proceeding in the same direction. The kingship of ourAnglo-Saxon regal houses was midway between the chieftainship ofa tribe and a territorial supremacy,. but the superiority of theNorman monarchs, imitated from that of the King of France, wasdistinctly a territorial sovereignty. Every subsequent dominionwhich was established or consolidated was formed on the latermodel. Spain, Naples, and the principalities founded on the ruinsof municipal freedom in Italy, were all under rulers whosesovereignty was territorial. Few things, I may add, are morecurious than the gradual lapse of the Venetians from one view tothe other. At the commencement of its foreign conquests, therepublic regarded itself as an antitype of the Romancommonwealth, governing a number of subject provinces. Move acentury onwards, and you find that it wishes to be looked upon asa corporate sovereign, claiming the rights of a feudal suzerainover its possessions in Italy and the AEgean.