The "exchange of labour for labour on the principle of equal valuation"{256}， in so far as it has any meaning， that is to say， the mutual exchangeability of products of equal social labour， hence the law of value， is the fundamental law of precisely commodity production， hence also of its highest form， capitalist production. It asserts itself in present-day society in the only way in which economic laws can assert themselves in a society of private producers： as a blindly operating law of nature inherent in things and relations， and independent of the will or actions of the producers. By elevating this law to the basic law of his economic commune and demanding that the commune should execute it in all consciousness， Herr Dühring converts the basic law of existing society into the basic law of his imaginary society. He wants existing society， but without its abuses. In this he occupies the same position as Proudhon. Like him， he wants to abolish the abuses which have arisen out of the development of commodity production into capitalist production， by giving effect against them to the basic law of commodity production， precisely the law to whose operation these abuses are due. Like him， he wants to abolish the real consequences of the law of value by means of fantastic ones.
Our modern Don Quixote， seated on his noble Rosinante， the "universal principle of justice" {D. C. 282}， and followed by his valiant Sancho Panza， Abraham Enss， sets out proudly on his knight errantry to win Mambrin's helmet， the "value of labour"； but we fear， fear greatly， he will bring home nothing but the old familiar barber's basin.
V.
STATE， FAMILY， EDUCATION W ith the two last chapters we have about exhausted the economic content of Herr Dühring's "new socialitarian system"{D. Ph. 295}. The only point we might add is that his "universal range of historical survey" {D. K. G. 2} does not in the least prevent him from safeguarding his own special interests， even apart from the moderate surplus consumption referred to above As the old division of labour continues to exist in the socialitarian system， the economic commune will have to reckon not only with architects and porters {500}， but also with professional writers， and the question will then arise how authors' rights are to be dealt with. This question is one which occupies Herr Dühring's attention more than any other. Everywhere， for example， in connection with Louis Blanc and Proudhon {D. C. 302； D. K. G. 482-83}， the reader stumbles across the question of authors' rights， until it is finally brought safely into the haven of "sociality"， after a circumstantial discussion occupying nine full pages of the Cursus ， in the form of a mysterious "remuneration of labour" {D. C. 307} -- whether with or without moderate surplus consumption， is not stated. A chapter on the position of fleas in the natural system of society would have been just as appropriate and in any case far less tedious.
The Philosophie gives detailed preions for the organisation of the state of the future. Here Rousseau， although "the sole important forerunner" {D. Ph. 264} of Herr Dühring， nevertheless did not lay the foundations deep enough； his more profound successor puts this right by completely watering down Rousseau and mixing in remnants of the Hegelian philosophy of right， also reduced to a watery mess. "The sovereignty of the individual" {268} forms the basis of the Dühringian state of the future； it is not to be suppressed by the rule of the majority， but to find its real culmination in it. How does this work？ Very simply.
"If one presupposes agreements between each individual and every other individual in all directions， and if the object of these agreements is mutual aid against unjust offences -- then the power required for the maintenance of right is only strengthened， and right is not deduced from the more superior strength of the many against the individual or of the majority against the minority" {268}.
Such is the ease with which the living force of the hocus-pocus of the philosophy of reality surmounts the most impassable obstacles； and if the reader thinks that after that he is no wiser than he was before， Herr Dühring replies that he really must not think it is such a simple matter， for "the slightest error in the conception of the role of the collective will would destroy the sovereignty of the individual， and this sovereignty is the only thing" (！) "conducive to the deduction of real rights" {268}.
Herr Dühring treats his public as it deserves， when he makes game of it. He could have laid it on much thicker； the students of the philosophy of reality would not have noticed it anyhow.
Now the sovereignty of the individual consists essentially in that "the individual is subject to absolute compulsion by the state"；this compulsion， however， can only be justified in so far as it "really serves natural justice" {271}. With this end in view there will be "legislative and judicial authority"， which， however， "must remain in the hands of the community" {272}； and there will also be an alliance for defence， which will find expression in "joint action in the army or in an executive section for the maintenance of internal security" {273}， that is to say， there will also be army， police， gendarmerie. Herr Dühring has many times already shown that he is a good Prussian； here he proves himself a peer of that model Prussian， who， as the late Minister von Rochow put it， "carries his gendarme in his breast". This gendarmerie of the future， however， will not be so dangerous as the police thugs [125] of the present day. Whatever the sovereign individual may suffer at their hands， he will always have one consolation ：
"the right or wrong which， according to the circumstances， may then be dealt to him by free society can never be an ， worse than that which the state of nature would have brought with it" {D. Ph.
274}！
