The separateness of the special group is also limited by personality， by the fact that the men who perform the specialty do not in other matters think apart from the rest of the society， but， in so far as it is a moral whole， share its general spirit and are the same men who， all taken together， are the seat of public opinion. How far the different departments of a man's mind， corresponding to general and special opinion， may be ruled by different principles， is a matter of interest from the fact that every one of us is the theatre of a conflict of moral standards arising in this way. It is evident by general observation and confession that we usually accept without much criticism the principles we become accustomed to in each sphere of (131) activity， whether consistent with one another or not. Yet this is not rational， and there is and must ever be a striving of conscience to redress such conflicts， which are really divisions in society itself， and tend toward anarchy. It is all easy but weak defence of low principles of conduct， in business， in politics， in war， in paying taxes， to say that a special standard prevails in this sphere， and that our behavior is justified by custom. We cannot wholly escape from the customary， but conscience should require of ourselves and others an honest effort to raise its standard， even at much sacrifice of lower aims. Such efforts are the only source of betterment， and without them society must deteriorate.
In other words， it is the chief and perhaps the only method of moral and intellectual progress that the thought and sentiment pertaining to the various activities should mingle in the mind， and that whatever is higher or more rational in each should raise the standard of the others.
If one finds that as a business man he tends to be greedy and narrow， he should call into that sphere. his sentiments as a patriot， a member of a family and a student， and he may enrich these latter provinces by the system and shrewdness he learns in business. The keeping of closed compartments is a principle of stagnation and decay.
The rule of public opinion， then， means for the most part a latent authority which the public will exercise when sufficiently dissatisfied with the specialist who is in immediate charge of a particular function. It cannot extend to the immediate participation of the group as a whole in the details of public business.
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This principle holds good in the conduct of government as well as elsewhere， experience showing that the politics of an intricate state is always a specialty， closer to the public interest， perhaps， than most specialties， but ordinarily controlled by those who， for whatever reason， put their main energy into it. Professional politicians， in this sense， are sure to win as against the amateur； and if politics is badly managed the chief remedy is to raise the level of the profession.
De Tocqueville says that " the people reign in the American political world as the Deity does in the universe. They are the cause and the aim of all things； everything comes from them and is absorbed by them." [2] And we may add that， also like the Deity， they do things through agents in whom the supposed attributes of their master are much obscured.
There are some who say we have no democracy， because much is done， in government as elsewhere， in neglect or defiance of general sentiment. But the same is true under any form of sovereignty； indeed， much more true under monarchy or oligarchy than under our form. The rule of the people is surely more real and pervasive than that of Louis XIV or Henry VIII.
No sovereign possesses completely its instruments， but democracy perhaps does so more nearly than any other.
When an important function， such as government， or trade or education， is not performed to the satisfaction of watchful consciences， the remedy is somewhat as follows. A rather general moral sentiment regarding the matter must be aroused by publishing the facts and ex (133) posing their inconsistency with underlying standards of right.
This sentiment will effect little so long as it is merely general， but if vigorous it rapidly begets organs through which to work. It is the nature of such a sentiment to stimulate particular individuals or groups to organize and effectuate it. The press has a motive to exploit and increase it by vivid exposition of the state of affairs； enthusiasm， seeking for an outlet， finds it in this direction； ambition and even pecuniary interest are enlisted to gratify the demand. Effective leadership thus arises， and organization， which thrives in the warmth of public attention， is not long wanting. Civic leagues and the like 梥upposing that it is a matter of politics梪nite with trusted leaders and the independent press to guide the voter in choosing between honesty and corruption. The moral standard of the professional group begins to rise： a few offenders are punished， many are alarmed， and things which every one has been doing or conniving at are felt as wrong.
In a vigorous democracy like that of the United States， this process is ever going on， on a great scale and in innumerable minor groups： the public mind， like a careful farmer， moves about its domain， hoeing weeds， mending fences and otherwise setting things to rights， undeterred by the fact that the work will not stay done.
Such regeneration implies the existence of a real， though perhaps latent， moral unity in the group whose standards are thus revived and applied.
It is， for instance， of untold advantage to all righteous movements in the United States， that the nation traditionally exists to the (134) ends of justice， freedom and humanity. This tradition means that there is already a noble and cherished ideal， no sincere appeal to which is vain； and we could as well dispense with the wisdom of the Constitution as with the sentiment of the Declaration of Independence.
On the same principle， it is a chief factor in the misgovernment of our cities that they are mostly too new and heterogeneous to have an established consciousness. As soon as the people feel their unity， we may hopefully look for civic virtue and devotion， because these things require a social medium in which to work. A man will not devote himself， ordinarily， where there is no distinct and human whole to devote himself to， no mind in which his devotion will be recognized and valued. But to a vital and enduring group devotion is natural， and we may expect that a self-conscious city， state， university or profession will prove to be a theatre of the magnanimous virtues.
Endnotes On the Outskirts of Public Life， The Atlantic Monthly， Feb.，1898. Democracy in America， vol. i， chap. 4.
