"Why, then, we now come to ask, should the governing body in a state profess a religion? First, because it is composed of individual men; and they, being appointed to act in a definite moral capacity, must sanctify their acts done in that capacity by the offices of religion; inasmuch as the acts cannot otherwise be acceptable to God, or anything but sinful and punishable in themselves.And whenever we turn our face away from God in our conduct, we are living atheistically....In fulfilment, then, of his obligations as an individual, the statesman must be a worshipping man.But his acts are public--the powers and instruments with which he works are public--acting under and by the authority of the law, he moves at his word ten thousand subject arms; and because such energies are thus essentially public, and wholly out of the range of mere individual agency, they must be sanctified not only by the private personal prayers and piety of those who fill public situations, but also by public acts of the men composing the public body.They must offer prayer and praise in their public and collective character--in that character wherein they constitute the organ of the nation, and wield its collective force.Wherever there is a reasoning agency there is a moral duty and responsibility involved in it.The governors are reasoning agents for the nation, in their conjoint acts as such.And therefore there must be attached to this agency, as that without which none of our responsibilities can be met, a religion.And this religion must be that of the conscience of the governor, or none."Here again we find propositions of vast sweep, and of sound so orthodox and solemn that many good people, we doubt not, have been greatly edified by it.But let us examine the words closely;and it will immediately become plain that, if these principles be once admitted, there is an end of all society.No combination can be formed for any purpose of mutual help, for trade, for public works, for the relief of the sick or the poor, for the promotion of art or science, unless the members of the combination agree in their theological opinions.Take any such combination at random, the London and Birmingham Railway Company for example, and observe to what consequences Mr.Gladstone's arguments inevitably lead.Why should the Directors of the Railway Company, in their collective capacity, profess a religion? First, because the direction is composed of individual men appointed to act in a definite moral capacity, bound to look carefully to the property, the limbs, and the lives of their fellow-creatures, bound to act diligently for their constituents, bound to govern their servants with humanity and justice, bound to fulfil with fidelity many important contracts.They must, therefore, sanctify their acts by the offices of religion, or these acts will be sinful and punishable in themselves.In fulfilment, then, of his obligations as an individual, the Director of the London and Birmingham Railway Company must be a worshipping man, But his acts are public.He acts for a body.He moves at his word ten thousand subject arms.And because these energies are out of the range of his mere individual agency, they must be sanctified by public acts of devotion.The Railway Directors must offer prayer and praise in their public and collective character, in that character wherewith they constitute the organ of the Company, and wield its collective power.Wherever there is reasoning agency, there is moral responsibility.The Directors are reasoning agents for the Company, and therefore there must be attached to this agency, as that without which none of our responsibilities can be met, a religion.And this religion must be that of the conscience of the Director himself, or none.There must be public worship and a test.No Jew, no Socinian, no Presbyterian, no Catholic, no Quaker, must, be permitted to be the organ of the Company, and to wield its collected force." Would Mr.Gladstone really defend this proposition? We are sure that he would not; but we are sure that to this proposition, and to innumerable similar propositions, his reasoning inevitably leads.
Again"National will and agency are indisputably one, binding either a dissentient minority or the subject body, in a manner that nothing but the recognition of the doctrine of national personality can justify.National honour and good faith are words in every one's mouth.How do they less imply a personality in nations than the duty towards God, for which we now contend? They are strictly and essentially distinct from the honour and good faith of the individuals composing the nation.France is a person to us, and we to her.A wilful injury done to her is a moral act, and a moral act quite distinct from the acts of all the individuals composing the nation.Upon broad facts like these we may rest, without resorting to the more technical proof which the laws afford in their manner of dealing with corporations.If, then, a nation have unity of will, have pervading sympathies, have capability of reward and suffering contingent upon its acts, shall we deny its responsibility; its need of a religion to meet that responsibility?..A nation, then, having a personality, lies under the obligation, like the individuals composing its governing body, of sanctifying the acts of that personality by the offices of religion, and thus we have a new and imperative ground for the existence of a state religion."A new ground we have here, certainly, but whether very imperative may be doubted.Is it not perfectly clear, that this argument applies with exactly as much force to every combination of human beings for a common purpose, as to governments? Is there any such combination in the world, whether technically a corporation or not, which has not this collective personality, from which Mr.
