Mr.Southey and many other respectable people seem to think that, when they have once proved the moral and religious training of the people to be a most important object, it follows, of course, that it is an object which the government ought to pursue.They forget that we have to consider, not merely the goodness of the end, but also the fitness of the means.Neither in the natural nor in the political body have all members the same office.There is surely no contradiction in saying that a certain section of the community may be quite competent to protect the persons and property of the rest, yet quite unfit to direct our opinions, or to superintend our private habits.
So strong is the interest of a ruler to protect his subjects against all depredations and outrages except his own, so clear and simple are the means by which this end is to be effected, that men are probably better off under the worst governments in the world than they would be in a state of anarchy.Even when the appointment of magistrates has been left to chance, as in the Italian Republics, things have gone on far better than if there had been no magistrates at all, and if every man had done what seemed right in his own eyes.But we see no reason for thinking that the opinions of the magistrate on speculative questions are more likely to be right than those of any other man.None of the modes by which a magistrate is appointed, popular election, the accident of the lot, or the accident of birth, affords, as far as we can perceive, much security for his being wiser than any of his neighbours.The chance of his being wiser than all his neighbours together is still smaller.Now we cannot understand how it can be laid down that it is the duty and the right of one class to direct the opinions of another, unless it can be proved that the former class is more likely to form just opinions than the latter.
The duties of government would be, as Mr.Southey says that they are, paternal, if a government were necessarily as much superior in wisdom to a people as the most foolish father, for a time, is to the most intelligent child, and if a government loved a people as fathers generally love their children.But there is no reason to believe that a government will have either the paternal warmth of affection or the paternal superiority of intellect.Mr.
Southey might as well say that the duties of the shoemaker are paternal, and that it is an usurpation in any man not of the craft to say that his shoes are bad and to insist on having better.The division of labour would be no blessing, if those by whom a thing is done were to pay no attention to the opinion of those for whom it is done.The shoemaker, in the Relapse, tells Lord Foppington that his Lordship is mistaken in supposing that his shoe pinches."It does not pinch; it cannot pinch; I know my business; and I never made a better shoe." This is the way in which Mr.Southey would have a government treat a people who usurp the privilege of thinking.Nay, the shoemaker of Vanbrugh has the advantage in the comparison.He contented himself with regulating his customer's shoes, about which he had peculiar means of information, and did not presume to dictate about the coat and hat.But Mr.Southey would have the rulers of a country prescribe opinions to the people, not only about politics, but about matters concerning which a government has no peculiar sources of information, and concerning which any man in the streets may know as much and think as justly as the King, namely religion and morals.
Men are never so likely to settle a question rightly as when they discuss it freely.A government can interfere in discussion only by making it less free than it would otherwise be.Men are most likely to form just opinions when they have no other wish than to know the truth, and are exempt from all influence, either of hope or fear.Government, as government, can bring nothing but the influence of hopes and fears to support its doctrines.It carries on controversy, not with reasons, but with threats and bribes.If it employs reasons, it does so, not in virtue of any powers which belong to it as a government.Thus, instead of a contest between argument and argument, we have a contest between argument and force.Instead of a contest in which truth, from the natural constitution of the human mind, has a decided advantage over falsehood, we have a contest in which truth can be victorious only by accident.
And what, after all, is the security which this training gives to governments? Mr.Southey would scarcely propose that discussion should be more effectually shackled, that public opinion should be more strictly disciplined into conformity with established institutions, than in Spain and Italy.Yet we know that the restraints which exist in Spain and Italy have not prevented atheism from spreading among the educated classes, and especially among those whose office it is to minister at the altars of God.
All our readers know how, at the time of the French Revolution, priest after priest came forward to declare that his doctrine, his ministry, his whole life, had been a lie, a mummery during which he could scarcely compose his countenance sufficiently to carry on the imposture.This was the case of a false, or at least of a grossly corrupted religion.Let us take then the case of all others most favourable to Mr.Southey's argument.Let us take that form of religion which he holds to be the purest, the system of the Arminian part of the Church of England.Let us take the form of government which he most admires and regrets, the government of England in the time of Charles the First.Would he wish to see a closer connection between Church and State than then existed? Would he wish for more powerful ecclesiastical tribunals? for a more zealous King? for a more active primate?
