To my mind， whatever doctrine professes to be the result of the application of the accepted rules of inductive and deductive logic to its subject-matter； and which accepts， within the limits which it sets to itself， the supremacy of reason， is Science. Whether the subject-matter consists of realities or unrealities， truths or falsehoods， is quite another question. Iconceive that ordinary geometry is science， by reason of its method， and I also believe that its axioms， definitions， and conclusions are all true. However， there is a geometry of four dimensions， which I also believe to be science， because its method professes to be strictly scientific. It is true that Icannot conceive four dimensions in space， and therefore， for me， the whole affair is unreal. But I have known men of great intellectual powers who seemed to have no difficulty either in conceiving them， or， at any rate， in imagining how they could conceive them； and， therefore， four-dimensioned geometry comes under my notion of science. So I think astrology is a science， in so far as it professes to reason logically from principles established by just inductive methods. To prevent misunderstanding， perhaps I had better add that I do not believe one whit in astrology； but no more do I believe in Ptolemaic astronomy， or in the catastrophic geology of my youth， although these， in their day， claimed--and， to my mind， rightly claimed--the name of science. If nothing is to be called science but that which is exactly true from beginning to end， I am afraid there is very little science in the world outside mathematics.
Among the physical sciences， I do not know that any could claim more than that it is true within certain limits， so narrow that， for the present at any rate， they may be neglected. If such is the case， I do not see where the line is to be drawn between exactly true， partially true， and mainly untrue forms of science. And what I have said about the current theology at the end of my paper [<i>supra</i> pp. 160-163] leaves， I think， no doubt as to the category in which I rank it. For all that， Ithink it would be not only unjust， but almost impertinent， to refuse the name of science to the "Summa" of St. Thomas or to the "Institutes" of Calvin.
In conclusion， I confess that my supposed "unjaded appetite" for the sort of controversy in which it needed not Mr. Gladstone's express declaration to tell us he is far better practised than Iam (though probably， without another express declaration， no one would have suspected that his controversial fires are burning low) is already satiated.
In "Elysium" we conduct scientific discussions in a different medium， and we are liable to threatenings of asphyxia in that "atmosphere of contention" in which Mr. Gladstone has been able to live， alert and vigorous beyond the common race of men， as if it were purest mountain air. I trust that he may long continue to seek truth， under the difficult conditions he has chosen for the search， with unabated energy--I had almost said fire--<quote>
May age not wither him， nor custom stale His infinite variety.
<end quote>
But Elysium suits my less robust constitution better， and I beg leave to retire thither， not sorry for my experience of the other region--no one should regret experience--but determined not to repeat it， at any rate in reference to the "plea for revelation."<quote>
NOTE ON THE PROPER SENSE OF THE "MOSAIC" NARRATIVEOF THE CREATION.
It has been objected to my argument from Leviticus (<i>suprà</i>
p. 170) that the Hebrew words translated by "creeping things" in Genesis i. 24 and Leviticus xi. 29， are different； namely， "reh-mes" in the former， "sheh-retz" in the latter. The obvious reply to this objection is that the question is not one of words but of the meaning of words. To borrow an illustration from our own language， if "crawling things" had been used by the translators in Genesis and "creeping things" in Leviticus， it would not have been necessarily implied that they intended to denote different groups of animals. "Sheh-retz" is employed in a wider sense than "reh-mes." There are "sheh-retz" of the waters of the earth， of the air， and of the land. Leviticus speaks of land reptiles， among other animals， as "sheh-retz"；Genesis speaks of all creeping land animals， among which land reptiles are necessarily included， as "reh-mes."Our translators， therefore， have given the true sense when they render both "sheh-retz" and "reh-mes" by "creeping things."Having taken a good deal of trouble to show what Genesis i.-ii.
4 does not mean， in the preceding pages， perhaps it may be well that I should briefly give my opinion as to what it does mean.
I conceive that the unknown author of this part of the Hexateuchal compilation believed， and meant his readers to believe， that his words， as they understood them--that is to say， in their ordinary natural sense--conveyed the "actual historical truth." When he says that such and such things happened， I believe him to mean that they actually occurred and not that he imagined or dreamed them； when he says "day，" Ibelieve he uses the word in the popular sense； when he says "made" or "created，" I believe he means that they came into being by a process analogous to that which the people whom he addressed called "making" or "creating"； and I think that， unless we forget our present knowledge of nature， and， putting ourselves back into the position of a Phoenician or a Chaldaean philosopher， start from his conception of the world， we shall fail to grasp the meaning of the Hebrew writer. We must conceive the earth to be an immovable， more or less flattened， body， with the vault of heaven above， the watery abyss below and around.
