This retreat of the Republican leaders was accompanied, however, by a new development in political tactics, which from the standpoint of party advantage, was ingeniously conceived.It was now held that, inasmuch as the President had avowed attachment to the principle of tenure of office during good behavior, his action in suspending officers therefore implied delinquency in their character or conduct from which they should be exonerated in case the removal was really on partisan grounds.In reporting upon nominations, therefore, Senate committees adopted the practice of noting that there were no charges of misconduct against the previous incumbents and that the suspension was on account of "political reasons." As these proceedings took place in executive session, which is held behind closed doors, reports of this character would not ordinarily reach the public, but the Senate now voted to remove the injunction of secrecy, and the reports were published.The manifest object of these maneuvers was to exhibit the President as acting upon the "spoils system"of distributing offices.The President's position was that he was not accountable to the Senate in such matters.In his message of the 1st of March he said: "The pledges I have made were made to the people, and to them I am responsible for the manner in which they have been redeemed.I am not responsible to the Senate, and I am unwilling to submit my actions and official conduct to them for judgement."While this contest was still going on, President Cleveland had to encounter another attempt of the Senate to take his authority out of his hands.The history of American diplomacy during this period belongs to another volume in this series,* but a diplomatic question was drawn into the struggle between the President and the Senate in such a way that it requires mention here.Shortly after President Cleveland took office, the fishery articles of the Treaty of Washington had terminated.In his first annual message to Congress, on December 8, 1885, he recommended the appointment of a commission to settle with a similar commission from Great Britain "the entire question of the fishery rights of the two governments and their respective citizens on the coasts of the United States and British North America." But this sensible advice was denounced as weak and cowardly.Oratory of the kind known as "twisting the lion's tail" resounded in Congress.Claims were made of natural right to the use of Canadian waters which would not have been indulged for a moment in respect of the territorial waters of the United States.For instance, it was held that a bay over six miles between headlands gave free ingress so long as vessels kept three miles from shore --a doctrine which, if applied to Long Island Sound, Delaware Bay, or Chesapeake Bay, would have impaired our national jurisdiction over those waters.Senator Frye of Maine took the lead in a rub-a-dub agitation in the presence of which some Democratic Senators showed marked timidity.The administration of public services by congressional committees has the incurable defect that it reflects the particular interests and attachments of the committeemen.Presidential administration is so circumstanced that it tends to be nationally minded; committee administration, just as naturally, tends to be locally minded.
Hence, Senator Frye was able to report from the committee on foreign relations a resolution declaring that a commission "charged with the consideration and settlement of the fishery rights...ought not to be provided for by Congress." Such was the attitude of the Senate towards the President on this question, that on April 13, 1886, this arrogant resolution was adopted by thirty-five ayes to 10 nays.A group of Eastern Democrats who were in a position to be affected by the longshore vote, joined with the Republicans in voting for the resolution, and among them Senator Gorman of Maryland, national chairman of the Democratic party.
* See "The Path of Empire," by Carl Russell Fish (in "The Chronicles of America").
President Cleveland was no more affected by this Senate resolution than he had been by their other resolutions attacking his authority.He went ahead with his negotiations and concluded treaty arrangements which the Senate, of course, rejected; but, as that result had been anticipated, a modus vivendi which had been arranged by executive agreements between the two countries went into effect, regardless of the Senate's attitude.The case is a signal instance of the substitution of executive arrangements for treaty engagements which has since then been such a marked tendency in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States.
