It may be true that in the region of attempts, as elsewhere, the law began with cases of actual intent, as those cases are the most obvious ones.But it cannot stop with them, unless it attaches more importance to the etymological meaning of the word attempt than to the general principles of punishment.Accordingly there is at least color of authority for the proposition that an act is punishable as an attempt, if, supposing it to have produced its natural and probable effect, it would have amounted to a substantive crime. But such acts are not the only punishable attempts.There is another class in which actual intent is clearly necessary, and the existence of this class as well as the name (attempt) no doubt tends to affect the whole doctrine.Some acts may be attempts or misdemeanors which could not have effected the crime unless followed by other acts on the part of the wrong-doer.For instance, lighting a match with intent to set fire to a haystack has been held to amount to a criminal attempt to burn it, although the defendant blew out the match on seeing that he was watched. So the purchase of dies for making counterfeit coin is a misdemeanor, although of course the coin would not be counterfeited unless the dies were used. In such cases the law goes on a new principle, different from that governing most substantive crimes.The reason for punishing any act must generally be to prevent some harm which is foreseen as likely to follow that act under the circumstances in which it is done.In most substantive crimes the ground on which that likelihood stands is the common working of natural causes as shown by experience.But when an act is punished the natural effect of which is not harmful under the circumstances, that ground alone will not suffice.The probability does not exist unless there are grounds for expecting that the act done will be followed by other acts in connection with which its effect will be harmful, although not so otherwise.But as in fact no such acts have followed, it cannot, in general, be assumed, from the mere doing of what has been done, that they would have followed if the actor had not been interrupted.They would not have followed it unless the actor had chosen, and the only way generally available to show that he would have chosen to do them is by showing that he intended to do them when he did what he did.The accompanying intent in that case renders the otherwise innocent act harmful, because it raises a probability that it will be followed by such other acts and events as will all together result in harm.The importance of the intent is not to show that the act was wicked, but to show that it was likely to be followed by hurtful consequences.
It will be readily seen that there are limits to this kind of liability.The law does not punish every act which is done with the intent to bring about a crime.If a man starts from Boston to Cambridge for the purpose of committing a murder when he gets there, but is stopped by the draw and goes home, he is no more punishable than if he had sat in his chair and resolved to shoot somebody, but on second thoughts had given up the notion.On the other hand, a slave who ran after a white woman, but desisted before he caught her, has been convicted of an attempt to commit rape. We have seen what amounts to an attempt to burn a haystack; but it was said in the same case, that, if the defendant had gone no further than to buy a box of matches for the purpose, he would not have been liable.
Eminent judges have been puzzled where to draw the line, or even to state the principle on which it should be drawn, between the two sets of cases.But the principle is believed to be similar to that on which all other lines are drawn by the law.Public policy, that is to say, legislative considerations, are at the bottom of the matter; the considerations being, in this case, the nearness of the danger, the greatness of the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt.When a man buys matches to fire a haystack, or starts on a journey meaning to murder at the end of it, there is still a considerable chance that he will change his mind before he comes to the point.But when he has struck the match, or cocked and aimed the pistol, there is very little chance that he will not persist to the end, and the danger becomes so great that the law steps in.With an object which could not be used innocently, the point of intervention might be put further back, as in the case of the purchase of a die for coining.
The degree of apprehension may affect the decision, as well as the degree of probability that the crime will be accomplished.No doubt the fears peculiar to a slaveowning community had their share in the conviction which has just been mentioned.
There is one doubtful point which should not be passed over.It has been thought that to shoot at a block of wood thinking it to be a man is not an attempt to murder, and that to put a hand into an empty pocket, intending to pick it, is not an attempt to commit larceny, although on the latter question there is a difference of opinion. The reason given is, that an act which could not have effected the crime if the actor had been allowed to follow it up to all results to which in the nature of things it could have led, cannot be an attempt to commit that crime when interrupted.At some point or other, of course, the law must adopt this conclusion, unless it goes on the theory of retribution for guilt, and not of prevention of harm.
