another person or thing have been less carefully considered hitherto than those which governed trespass, and I shall therefore devote the rest of this Lecture to discussing them.Ishall try to show that this liability also had its root in the passion of revenge, and to point out the changes by which it reached its present form.But I shall not confine myself strictly to what is needful for that purpose, because it is not only most interesting to trace the transformation throughout its whole extent, but the story will also afford an instructive example of the mode in which the law has grown, without a break, from barbarism to civilization.Furthermore, it will throw much light upon some important and peculiar doctrines which cannot be returned to later.
A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student of history, is this.The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula.In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains.The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for.Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and enters on a new career.
The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received.The subject under consideration illustrates this course of events very clearly.
I will begin by taking a medley of examples embodying as many distinct rules, each with its plausible and seemingly sufficient ground of policy to explain it.
A man has an animal of known ferocious habits, which escapes and does his neighbor damage.He can prove that the animal escaped through no negligence of his, but still he is held liable.Why? It is, says the analytical jurist, because, although he was not negligent at the moment of escape, he was guilty of remote heedlessness, or negligence, or fault, in having such a creature at all.And one by whose fault damage is done ought to pay for it.
A baker's man, while driving his master's cart to deliver hot rolls of a morning, runs another man down.The master has to pay for it.And when he has asked why he should have to pay for the wrongful act of an independent and responsible being, he has been answered from the time of Ulpian to that of Austin, that it is because he was to blame for employing an improper person.If he answers, that he used the greatest possible care in choosing his driver, he is told that that is no excuse; and then perhaps the reason is shifted, and it is said that there ought to be a remedy against some one who can pay the damages, or that such wrongful acts as by ordinary human laws are likely to happen in the course of the service are imputable to the service.
Next, take a case where a limit has been set to liability which had previously been unlimited.In 1851, Congress passed a law, which is still in force, and by which the owners of ships in all the more common cases of maritime loss can surrender the vessel and her freight then pending to the losers; and it is provided that, thereupon, further proceedings against the owners shall cease.The legislators to whom we owe this act argued that, if a merchant embark a portion of his property upon a hazardous venture, it is reasonable that his stake should be confined to what he puts at risk,--a principle similar to that on which corporations have been so largely created in America during the last fifty years.
It has been a rule of criminal pleading in England down into the present century, that an indictment for homicide must set forth the value of the instrument causing the death, in order that the king or his grantee might claim forfeiture of the deodand, "as an accursed thing," in the language of Blackstone.
I might go on multiplying examples; but these are enough to show the remoteness of the points to be brought together.-- As a first step towards a generalization, it will be necessary to consider what is to be found in ancient and independent systems of law.
There is a well-known passage in Exodus, which we shall have to remember later: "If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shah not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit." When we turn from the Jews to the Greeks, we find the principle of the passage just quoted erected into a system.Plutarch, in his Solon, tells us that a dog that had bitten a man was to be delivered up bound to a log four cubits long.Plato made elaborate provisions in his Laws for many such cases.If a slave killed a man, he was to be given up to the relatives of the deceased. If he wounded a man, he was to be given up to the injured party to use him as he pleased. So if he did damage to which the injured party did not contribute as a joint cause.In either case, if the owner
