But, again, the supposed intuition of fitness does not seem to me to be coextensive with the thing to be accounted for.The lesser punishments are just as fit for the lesser crimes as the greater for the greater.The demand that crime should be followed by its punishment should therefore be equal and absolute in both.
Again, a malum prohibitum is just as much a crime as a malum in se.If there is any general ground for punishment, it must apply to one case as much as to the other.But it will hardly be said that, if the wrong in the case just supposed consisted of a breach of the revenue laws, and the government had been indemnified for the loss, we should feel any internal necessity that a man who had thoroughly repented of his wrong should be punished for it, except on the ground that his act was known to others.If it was known, the law would have to verify its threats in order that others might believe and tremble.But if the fact was a secret between the sovereign and the subject, the sovereign, if wholly free from passion, would undoubtedly see that punishment in such a case was wholly without justification.
On the other hand, there can be no case in which the law-maker makes certain conduct criminal without his thereby showing a wish and purpose to prevent that conduct.Prevention would accordingly seem to be the chief and only universal purpose of punishment.
The law threatens certain pains if you do certain things, intending thereby to give you a new motive for not doing them.If you persist in doing them, it has to inflict the pains in order that its threats may continue to be believed.
If this is a true account of the law as it stands, the law does undoubtedly treat the individual as a means to an end, and uses him as a tool to increase the general welfare at his own expense.It has been suggested above, that this course is perfectly proper; but even if it is wrong, our criminal law follows it, and the theory of our criminal law must be shaped accordingly.
Further evidence that our law exceeds the limits of retribution, and subordinates consideration of the individual to that of the public well-being, will be found in some doctrines which cannot be satisfactorily explained on any other ground.
The first of these is, that even the deliberate taking of life will not be punished when it is the only way of saving one's own.
This principle is not so clearly established as that next to be mentioned; but it has the support of very great authority. If that is the law, it must go on one of two grounds, either that self-preference is proper in the case supposed, or that, even if it is improper, the law cannot prevent it by punishment, because a threat of death at some future time can never be a sufficiently powerful motive to make a man choose death now in order to avoid the threat.If the former ground is adopted, it admits that a single person may sacrifice another to himself, and a fortiori that a people may.If the latter view is taken, by abandoning punishment when it can no longer be expected to prevent an act, the law abandons the retributive and adopts the preventive theory.
The next doctrine leads to still clearer conclusions.Ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking it.This substantive principle is sometimes put in the form of a rule of evidence, that every one is presumed to know the law.It has accordingly been defended by Austin and others, on the ground of difficulty of proof.If justice requires the fact to be ascertained, the difficulty of doing so is no ground for refusing to try.But every one must feel that ignorance of the law could never be admitted as an excuse, even if the fact could be proved by sight and hearing in every case.Furthermore, now that parties can testify, it may be doubted whether a man's knowledge of the law is any harder to investigate than many questions which are gone into.The difficulty, such as it is, would be met by throwing the burden of proving ignorance on the lawbreaker.
The principle cannot be explained by saying that we are not only commanded to abstain from certain acts, but also to find out that we are commanded.For if there were such a second command, it is very clear that the guilt of failing to obey it would bear no proportion to that of disobeying the principal command if known, yet the failure to know would receive the same punishment as the failure to obey the principal law.
The true explanation of the rule is the same as that which accounts for the law's indifference to a man's particular temperament, faculties, and so forth.Public policy sacrifices the individual to the general good.It is desirable that the burden of all should be equal, but it is still more desirable to put an end to robbery and murder.It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales.
If the foregoing arguments are sound, it is already manifest that liability to punishment cannot be finally and absolutely determined by considering the actual personal unworthiness of the criminal alone.That consideration will govern only so far as the public welfare permits or demands.And if we take into account the general result which the criminal law is intended to bring about, we shall see that the actual state of mind accompanying a criminal act plays a different part from what is commonly supposed.
