117/3 Mitten v. Fandrye, Popham, 161; S.C., 1 Sir W. Jones, 136;S.C., nom. Millen v. Hawery, Latch, 13; id. 119. In the latter report, at p. 120, after reciting the opinion of the court in accordance with the text, it is said that judgment was given non obstant for the plaintiff; contrary to the earlier statement in the same book, and to Popham and Jones; but the principle was at all events admitted. For the limit, see Read v. Edwards, 17 C.B.
N.S. 245.
118/1 Y.B. 22 Edw. IV. 8, pl. 24.
118/2 Popham, at p. 162; S.C., Latch, at p. 120; cf. Mason v.
Keeling, 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608. But cf. Y.B. 20 Edw. IV. 10, 11, pl. 10.
118/3 Latch, at p. 120. This is a further illustration of the very practical grounds on which the law of trespass was settled.
118/4 12 Mod. 332, 335; S.C., 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608.
118/5 12 Mod. 335; Dyer, 25 b, pl. 162, and cas. in marg.; 4 Co.
Rep. 18 b; Buxendin v. Sharp, 2 Salk. 662; S.C., 3 Salk. 169;S.C., nom. Bayntine v. Sharp, 1 Lutw. 90; Smith v. Pelah, 2Strange, 264; May v. Burdett, 9 Q.B. 101; Card v. Case, 5 C.B.
622.
119/1 12 Mod. 335. See Andrew Baker's case, 1 Hale, P.C. 430.
119/2 Besozzi v. Harris, 1 F.&F. 92.
119/3 See Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. I Ex. 265, 281, 282; Cox v.
Burbridge, 13 C.B. N.S. 430, 441; Read v. Edwards, 17 C.B. N.S.
245, 260; Lee v. Riley, 18 C.B. N.S. 722; Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L.R. 10 C.P. 10; 27 Ass., pl. 56, fol. 141; Y.B. 20 Ed. IV.
11, pl. 10; 13 Hen. VII. 15, pl. 10; Keilway, 3 b, pl. 7. Cf. 4Kent (12th ed.), 110, n. 1, ad fin.
120/1 2 Ld. Raym. 909; 13 Am. L.R. 609.
120/2 See Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co., L.R. 1 C.P.
600, 612, 614.
120/3 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 383.
121/1 L.R. 1 C.P. 300.
121/2 See Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232, 239, bottom.
121/3 Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, 487.
122/1 See Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577, 583; Rex v. Oneby, 2 Strange, 766, 773; Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hobart, 105, 107;Wigram, Disc., pl. 249; Evans on Pleading, 49, 138, 139, 143 et seq.; Id., Miller's ed., pp. 147, 149.
123/1 See Detroit & Milwaukee R. R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17Mich. 99, 120.
123/2 In the small-pox case, Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, while the court ruled with regard to the defendant's conduct as has been mentioned, it held that whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in not having vaccinated his children was "a question of fact, and was properly left to the jury." p.
488.
124/1 Metropolitan Railway Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193, 197.
125/1 See Kearney v. London, Brighton & S. Coast Ry. Co., L.R. 5Q.B. 411, 414, 417; S.C., 6 id. 759.
125/2 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722.
125/3 See Skinnier v. Lodon, Brighton, & S. Coast Ry. Co., 5Exch. 787. But cf. Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588, 594.
127/1 7 American Law Review, 654 et seq., July, 1873.
128/1 Callahan v. Bean, 9 Allen, 401.
128/2 Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567.
128/3 Lovett v. Salem & South Danvers R. R. Co., 9 Allen, 557.
128/4 Back v. Stacey, 2 C.&P. 465.
128/5 Cf. Beadel v. Perry, L.R. 3 Eq. 465; City of London Brewery Co. v. Termant, L.R. 9 Ch. 212, 220; Hackett v. Baiss, L.R. 20Eq. 494; Theed v. Debenham, 2 Ch. D. 165.
135/1 Williamson v. Allison, 2 East, 446.
136/1 Leather v. Simpson, L.R. 11 Eq. 398, 406. On the other hand, the extreme moral view is stated in Weir v. Bell, 3 Ex. D.
238, 243.
138/1 As to actual knowledge and intent, see Lecture II. p. 57.
141/1 Cf. Knight v. German, Cro. Eliz. 70; S.C., ib. 134.
141/2 Mitchell v. Jenkins, 5 B.&Ad. 588, 594; Turner v. Ambler, 10 Q.B. 252, 257, 261.
142/1 Redfield, C. J. in Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189, 197.
142/2 Mitchell v. Jenkins, 5 B.&Ad. 588, 595.
143/1 See Burton v. Fulton, 49 Penn. St. 151.
144/1 Rolfe, B. in Fouldes v. Willoughby, 8 Meeson & Welsby, 540.
145/1 Supra, pp. 115 et seq.
147/1 See, e.g., Cooley, Torts, 164.
147/2 Rex v. Dixon, 3 Maule & Selwyn, 11, 15; Reg. v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360; 5 C.&P. 266, n.
148/1 Aleyn, 35; Style, 72; A.D. 1648.
149/1 1 Kent (12th ed.), 467, n. 1; 6 Am. Law Rev. 723-725; 7 id.
652.
149/2 2 Wm. Bl. 892, A.D. 1773; supra, p. 92; Addison on Torts (4th ed.), 264, citing Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 37, pl. 26, which hardly sustains the broad language of the text.
151/1 Compare Crouch v. London & N. W. R. Co., 14 C.B. 255, 283;Calye's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 32; Co. Lit. 89 a, n. 7; 1 Ch. Pl. (lst ed,), 219, (6th ed.), 216, 217; 7 Am. Law Rev. 656 et seq.
151/2 But cf. The Pawashick, 2 Lowell, 142.
151/3 Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384, 398, 399; Barnett v.
Brandao, 6 Man. & Gr. 630, 665; Hawkins v. Cardy, 1 Ld. Raym.
360.
151/4 Pickering v. Barkley, Style, 132; Wegerstoffe v. Keene, 1Strange, 214, 216, 223; Smith v. Kendall, 6 T. R. 123, 124.
155/1 Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622, 634. Cf. Austin (3d ed.), 513.
156/1 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330; supra, p. 116.
156/2 See Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J. (9 Vroom), 339; 2Thompson, Negligence, 1234, n. 3.
157/1 Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232; supra, p. 117.
158/1 Mitchil v. Alestree, 1 Vent. 295; S.C., 3 Keb. 650; 2 Lev.
172; supra, p. 94.
158/2 Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588.
166/1 Laband, Vermogensrechtlichen Klagen, Section16, pp. 108 et seq.; Heusler, Gewere, 487, 492. These authors correct the earlier opinion of Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, Section37, pp. 313 et seq., adopted by Sohm in his Proc. d. Lex Salica, Section 9. Cf.
the discussion of sua in writs of trespass, &c. in the English law, at the end of Lecture VI. Those who wish short accounts in English may consult North Amer. Rev., CX. 210, and see Id., CXVIII. 416; Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law, pp. 212 et seq. Our knowledge as to the primitive form of action is somewhat meagre and dependent on inference. Some of the earliest texts are Ed.
