Then there were some minor mistakes that aided in a great degree the bringing about of that mishap which imperiled the safety of the entire army.Even granting that Johnson was not in any way responsible for the position occupied by his troops on the front line of battle, still it is hard to find any excuse or even explanation for a general officer in command of a division who, knowing the enemy were in force on his front, and intending to attack his command at daylight the next morning, would place his headquarters a mile and a half in the rear.This too, when he knew that the post of honor and responsibility for the safety of the entire army had been committed to his keeping.What then shall be said for him when it appears by the report of the commanding officer of his reserve brigade that when it returned from the support of a cavalry reconnoissance, the general commanding the division ordered this brigade, on the eve of the battle, to take position in the woods, "near the headquarters of the division," instead of in supporting distance of the front line? He could not have thought that the division headquarters needed the support of the reserve more than the line of battle.It is safe to say that had the line of Johnson's division been properly formed, so as to give the most strength to the command--short and well centered, with a good brigade like that of Baldwin's in reserve, with all officers in their places--these troops would have given a very different account of themselves when the blow struck the right.There was no commanding officer in the front with Johnson's division, of greater command than a regiment--save General Kirk.The troops of Willich's brigade on the right flank refused to come to his assistance, because there was no one there to give them orders.Johnson says in his official report that "In consultation with Major-General McCook, late in the afternoon of December 30th, he informed me that he had reliable information to the effect that the centre of the rebel line of battle was opposite our extreme right, and that we would probably be attacked by the entire rebel army early on the following morning." Johnson then coolly adds: "His prediction proved true." Yet with these facts staring them in the face, McCook and Johnson made no other efforts to strengthen the right of the line, and Johnson, on the arrival of his reserve brigade later, posted it in the woods a mile and a half from his front "near his headquarters." General Kirk was mortally wounded in the attack on his command, but lived long enough after the battle to make a report of the part taken in the engagement by his brigade.He states in his report, that he suggested to Johnson to send his reserve brigade to support the main lines, and that Johnson declined to do so.
The location of Johnson's headquarters, and Johnson being there, makes him responsible for the capture of Willich, and the breaking up of that brigade.Willich had been on the line for an hour before daylight with his brigade under arms, and from what he heard of the movements of the enemy to his front, he was satisfied that a change should be made in the position of his division, and started to Johnson's headquarters to communicate with him.Before he could return to his troops, the enemy was upon them, and drove them from the position they held, without their making a stand.Being without either division or brigade commander, they drifted to the rear.Willich had a horse shot under him, and was captured without giving an order, before he reached his command.
When the artillery was posted in line of battle on the 30th, roads were cut through the cedars to allow the batteries to reach the front line.The heavy loss of guns, reported by Rosecrans, was occasioned by these batteries being unable to reach the roads through the cedar thickets in the retreat, and in many instances guns were abandoned in the woods, through which it was impossible to haul them.
Bragg alleges in his official report that our troops were surprised, and cites the fact that his men passed through the camps where breakfast was being prepared.He was right as to this fact, but wrong about his deduction.Willich's brigade was the only one that was not through the morning meal, and this was by reason of his troops being under arms for nearly two hours prior to this time, after which Willich gave them orders to prepare their meal.Kirk's brigade had been under arms since five o'clock in the morning, ready for action an hour before the battle commenced, and in Post's brigade the men were in order of battle for an hour before the first dawn of light.The front of all these brigades was covered with heavy picket lines well thrown out.General Sill reported to General Sheridan at two o'clock in the morning, "great activity on the part of the enemy immediately in his front, with movements of troops to their left," and from four o'clock in the morning until seven, Sheridan's troops were standing under arms, and the cannoneeers were at their places.
It is difficult to determine which to admire more, the heavy, quick, decided onset of the rebels, as with ranks well closed up, without music, and almost noiselessly, they moved in the gray light of the early December morning, out of the cedars, across the open fields, hurling the full weight of their advancing columns upon our right, with all the dash of Southern troops, sweeping on with rapid stride, and wild yells of triumph, to what appeared to them an easy final victory; or, later in the afternoon, when our troops that had been driven from the field early in the morning, were reformed under the eye of the commanding general, met and threw back from the point of the bayonet, and from the cannon mouth, the charge after charge of the same victorious troops of the earlier portion of the day.One was like the resistless sweep of a whirlwind in its onward course of destruction, the other the grand sturdy resistance of the rocky coast, which the waves only rush upon to be dashed to pieces.In each of these, the two armies displayed their distinctive feature to the best.Under Thomas, the Centre of the army evinced, in a marked degree, the staying qualities of that commander, which afterward were shown so conspicuously at Chickamauga.
