2.The decrees of the whole people of Rome,comprehending the Senate,when they were put to the question by the Senate.These were laws,at first,by the virtue of the sovereign power residing in the people;and such of them as by the emperors were not abrogated remained laws by the authority imperial.For all laws that bind are understood to be laws by his authority that has power to repeal them.Somewhat like to these laws are the Acts of Parliament in England.
3.The decrees of the common people,excluding the Senate,when they were put to the question by the tribune of the people.For such of them as were not abrogated by the emperors,remained laws by the authority imperial.Like to these were the orders of the House of Commons in England.
4.Senatus consulta,the orders of the Senate:because when the people of Rome grew so numerous as it was inconvenient to assemble them,it was thought fit by the emperor that men should consult the Senate instead of the people:and these have some resemblance with the Acts of Council.
5.The edicts of praetors,and in some cases of the aediles:such as are the chief justices in the courts of England.
6.Responsa prudentum,which were the sentences and opinions of those lawyers to whom the emperor gave authority to interpret the law,the law,and to give answer to such as in matter of law demanded their advice;which answers the judges in giving judgement were obliged by the constitutions of the emperor to observe:and should be like the reports of cases judged,if other judges be by the law of England bound to observe them.For the judges of the common law of England are not properly judges,but juris consulti;of whom the judges,who are either the lords,or twelve men of the country,are in point of law to ask advice.
7.Also,unwritten customs,which in their own nature are an imitation of law,by the tacit consent of the emperor,in case they be not contrary to the law of nature,are very laws.
Another division of laws is into natural and positive.Natural are those which have been laws from all eternity,and are called not only natural,but also moral laws,consisting in the moral virtues;as justice,equity,and all habits of the mind that conduce to peace and charity,of which I have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.
Positive are those which have not been from eternity,but have been made laws by the will of those that have had the sovereign power over others,and are either written or made known to men by some other argument of the will of their legislator.
Again,of positive laws some are human,some divine:and of human positive laws,some are distributive,some penal.Distributive are those that determine the rights of the subjects,declaring to every man what it is by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands or goods,and a right or liberty of action:and these speak to all the subjects.Penal are those which declare what penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the law;and speak to the ministers and officers ordained for execution.For though every one ought to be informed of the punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression;nevertheless the command is not addressed to the delinquent (who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himself),but to public ministers appointed to see the penalty executed.And these penal laws are for the most part written together with the laws distributive,and are sometimes called judgements.For all laws are general judgements,or sentences of the legislator;as also every particular judgement is a law to him whose case is judged.
Divine positive laws (for natural laws,being eternal and universal,are all divine)are those which,being the commandments of God,not from all eternity,nor universally addressed to all men,but only to a certain people or to certain persons,are declared for such by those whom God hath authorized to declare them.But this authority of man to declare what be these positive of God,how can it be known?God may command a man,by a supernatural way,to deliver laws to other men.
But because it is of the essence of law that he who is to be obliged be assured of the authority of him that declareth it,which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God,how can a man without supernatural revelations be assured of the revelation received by the declarer?And how can he be bound to obey bound to obey them?
For the first question,how a man can be assured of the revelation of another without a revelation particularly to himself,it is evidently impossible:for though a man may be induced to believe such revelation,from the miracles they see him do,or from seeing the extraordinary sanctity of his life,or from seeing the extraordinary wisdom,or extraordinary felicity of his actions,all which are marks of God's extraordinary favour;yet they are not assured evidences of special revelation.Miracles are marvellous works;but that which is marvellous to one may not be so to another.Sanctity may be feigned;and the visible felicities of this world are most often the work of God by natural and ordinary causes.And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason that another has had a supernatural revelation of God's will but only a belief;every one,as the signs thereof shall appear greater or lesser,a firmer or a weaker belief.
