A.I can only call a corporeal thing or an object in space "mine,"when, even although not in physical possession of it, I am able to assert that I am in possession of it in another real nonphysical sense.Thus, I am not entitled to call an apple mine merely because I hold it in my hand or possess it physically; but only when I am entitled to say, "I possess it, although I have laid it out of my hand, and wherever it may lie." In like manner, I am not entitled to say of the ground, on which I may have laid myself down, that therefore it is mine; but only when I can rightly assert that it still remains in my possession, although I may have left the spot.For any one who, in the former appearances of empirical possession, might wrench the apple out of my hand, or drag me away from my resting-place, would, indeed, injure me in respect of the inner "mine"of freedom, but not in respect of the external "mine," unless Icould assert that I was in the possession of the object, even when not actually holding it physically.And if I could not do this, neither could I call the apple or the spot mine.
B.I cannot call the performance of something by the action of the will of another "mine," if I can only say "it has come into my possession at the same time with a promise" (pactum re initum); but only if I am able to assert "I am in possession of the will of the other, so as to determine him to the performance of a particular act, although the time for the performance of it has not yet come." In the latter case, the promise belongs to the nature of things actually held as possessed, and as an active obligation I can reckon it mine; and this holds good not only if I have the thing promised- as in the first case- already in my possession, but even although I do not yet possess it in fact.Hence, I must be able to regard myself in thought as independent of that empirical form of possession that is limited by the condition of time and as being, nevertheless, in possession of the object.
C.I cannot call a wife, a child, a domestic, or, generally, any other person "mine" merely because I command them at present as belonging to my household, or because I have them under control, and in my power and possession.But I can call them mine, if, although they may have withdrawn themselves from my control and I do not therefore possess them empirically, I can still say "I possess them by my mere will, provided they exist anywhere in space or time; and, consequently, my possession of them is purely juridical." They belong, in fact, to my possessions, only when and so far as I can assert this as a matter of right.
5.Definition of the Conception of the External Mine and Thine.
Definitions are nominal or real.A nominal definition is sufficient merely to distinguish the object defined from all other objects, and it springs out of a complete and definite exposition of its conception.A real definition further suffices for a deduction of the conception defined, so as to furnish a knowledge of the reality of the object.The nominal definition of the external "mine" would thus be: "The external mine is anything outside of myself, such that any hindrance of my use of it at will would be doing me an injury or wrong as an infringement of that freedom of mine which may coexist with the freedom of all others according to a universal law." The real definition of this conception may be put thus: "The external mine is anything outside of myself, such that any prevention of my use of it would be a wrong, although I may not be in possession of it so as to be actually holding it as an object." I must be in some kind of possession of an external object, if the object is to be regarded as mine; for, otherwise, anyone interfering with this object would not, in doing so, affect me; nor, consequently, would he thereby do me any wrong.Hence, according to SS 4, a rational possession (possessio noumenon) must be assumed as possible, if there is to be rightly an external mine and thine.Empirical possession is thus only phenomenal possession or holding (detention) of the object in the sphere of sensible appearance (possessio phenomenon), although the object which I possess is not regarded in this practical relation as itself a phenomenon- according to the exposition of the Transcendental Analytic in the Critique of Pure Reason- but as a thing in itself.For in the Critique of Pure Reason the interest of reason turns upon the theoretical knowledge of the nature of things and how far reason can go in such knowledge.But here reason has to deal with the practical determination of the action of the will according to laws of freedom, whether the object is perceivable through the senses or merely thinkable by the pure understanding.And right, as under consideration, is a pure practical conception of the reason in relation to the exercise of the will under laws of freedom.
And, hence, it is not quite correct to speak of "possessing" a right to this or that object, but it should rather be said that an object is possessed in a purely juridical way; for a right is itself the rational possession of an object, and to "possess a possession," would be an expression without meaning.
6.Deduction of the Conception of a Purely Juridical Possession of an External Object (Possessio Noumenon).
