When the spectator of another man's situation, upon bringing home to himself all its various circumstances, feels himself affected in the same manner with the person principally concerned, he approves of the affection or passion of this person as just, proper, and suitable to its object.We judge of the propriety of the affection of another only by its coincidence with that which we feel when we put ourselves in the same circumstances, and the perception of this coincidence is the foundation of the perception of moral obligation.Now this is a very circuitous way of gendering our moral ideas and judgments.Whether we look to ourselves or others, the mind pronounces a judgment upon the act, --say a deed of benevolence or cruelty, -- and must do so according to some law which is the true basis of morality.
We are more likely to {169} pronounce first upon ourselves.
But it may be acknowledged that it does help us in forming a correct judgment, to put ourselves in the position of others, and inquire how they would view us; and hence the important rule: " Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them." This is the element of truth in Smith's theory.In illustrating his views, he is particularly happy in showing how circumstances affect our moral judgments; that, for example, when there is no envy in the case, our sympathy with joy is much stronger than our sympathy with sorrow, and that in consequence it is more easy to obtain the approbation of mankind in prosperity than in adversity.From the same principle he traces the origin of ambition, or of the desire of rank and pre-eminence the great object of which passion is to attain that situation which sets a man most in view of general sympathy and attention, and gives an easy empire over the affections of others.
Having thus shown how we come to a sense of propriety (as he calls moral excellence), he proceeds to analyze our sense of merit and demerit, which have always a respect to the effect which the affection tends to produce.The only actions which appear to us deserving of reward are actions of a beneficial tendency, proceeding from proper motives, with which we can sympathize; the only actions which seem to us to deserve punishment are actions of a hurtful tendency, proceeding from improper motives.He accounts for our sense of justice by the circumstance that, if I wish to secure the sympathy and approbation of my fellow-men, -- represented by Smith as the strongest desire of our natures, -- it is necessary for me to regard my happiness not in that light in which it appears to myself, but that in which it appears to mankind in general, as if in all justice there was not an inflexible rule for judging of the conduct both of ourselves and others.
He then shows how our sense of duty comes to be formed in consequence of an application to ourselves of the judgments we have previously passed on others.In doing this we lay down rules of morality which become universally applicable.He allows to Hume that every thing approved of by the mind is useful and agreeable; but he insists that it is not the view of this utility which is either the first or principal source of moral approbation.{170}
Most people have felt that this theory is too artificial, -- is too ingenious to be true.It contains some elements of truth, but they are not put in their proper place; and the fabric is left without a sure foundation, --virtue has no other foundation than the sympathy and approbation of men.The beauty of the building lies not in the structure as a whole, but in portions, often subordinate portions of it.His illustrations are abundant, and always felicitous; and many of them show a very nice and delicate perception of the peculiarities of human nature.We see this very specially in his chapter " Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our Notions of Beauty and Deformity," --perhaps the most valuable part of his work, as being that in which he sketches the various moral systems, such as those of the Stoics and Epicureans.Here he shows erudition, and enters thoroughly into the spirit of the authors and their times.The work will continue to be read for its style and these adjuncts, by persons who set no value on the theory which be expounds.
Smith intended to write a connected history of the liberal sciences and elegant arts, but found the plan far too extensive.He has left us only a few fragments, which were published posthumously by Joseph Black and James Hutton.In these be discusses, always ingeniously, such topics as the nature of the imitation which takes place in what are called the imitative arts; the affinity between music, dancing, and poetry; the affinity between English and Italian verses.But the most valuable of these papers, are three on the principles which lead and direct philosophical inquiries, Illustrated by the history of astronomy, of ancient physics, of ancient logic and metaphysics, and one on the external senses.
