..The mass of the Southern blacks fall, in point of intelligence, but little, if any, behind the mass of the Southern whites....In reference to the qualifications of the voter, men make too much account of the head and too little of the heart.The ballot-box, like God, says: "Give me your heart." The best-hearted men are the best qualified to vote; and, in this light, the blacks, with their characteristic gentleness, patience, and affectionateness, are peculiarly entitled to vote.We cannot wonder at Swedenborg's belief that the celestial people will be found in the interior of Africa; nor hardly can we wonder at the legend that the gods came down every year to sup with their favorite Africans."One of the most statesmanlike proposals was made by Governor John A.Andrew of Massachusetts.If, forgetting their theories, the conservatives could have united in support of a restoration conceived in his spirit, the goal might have been speedily achieved.Andrew demanded a reorganization, based upon acceptance of the results of the war, but carried through with the aid of "those who are by their intelligence and character the natural leaders of their people and who surely will lead them by and by."These men cannot be kept out forever, said he, for the capacity of leadership is a gift, not a device.They whose courage, talents, and will entitle them to lead, will lead....If we cannot gain their support of the just measures needful for the work of safe reorganization, reorganization will be delusive and full of danger.They are the most hopeful subjects to deal with.They have the brain and the experience and the education to enable them to understand...the present situation.They have the courage as well as the skill to lead the people in the direction their judgments point....Is it consistent with reason and our knowledge of human nature, to believe the masses of Southern men able to face about, to turn their backs on those they have trusted and followed, and to adopt the lead of those who have no magnetic hold on their hearts or minds? It would be idle to reorganize by the colored vote.If the popular vote of the white race is not to be had in favor of the guarantees justly required, then I am in favor of holding on--just where we are now.I am not in favor of a surrender of the present rights of the Union to a struggle between a white minority aided by the freedmen on one hand, against the majority of the white race on the other.I would not consent, having rescued those states by arms from Secession and rebellion, to turn them over to anarchy and chaos."The Southerners, Unionists as well as Confederates, had their views as well, but at Washington these carried little influence.The former Confederates would naturally favor the plan which promised best for the white South, and their views were most nearly met by those of President Lincoln.Although he held that in principle a new Union had arisen out of the war, as a matter of immediate political expediency he was prepared to build on the assumption that the old Union still existed.The Southern Unionists cared little for theories;they wanted the Confederates punished, themselves promoted to high offices, and the Negro kept from the ballot box.
Even at the beginning of 1866, it was not too much to hope that the majority of former Republicans would accept conservative methods, provided the so-called "fruits of the war" were assured--that is, equality of civil rights, the guarantee of the United States war debt, the repudiation of the Confederate debt, the temporary disfranchisement of the leading Confederates, and some arrangement which would keep the South from profiting by representation based on the non-voting Negro population.But amid many conflicting policies, none attained to continuous and compelling authority.
The plan first put to trial was that of President Lincoln.It was a definite plan designed to meet actual conditions and, had he lived, he might have been able to carry it through successfully.Not a theorist, but an opportunist of the highest type, sobered by years of responsibility in war time, and fully understanding the precarious situation in 1865, Lincoln was most anxious to secure an early restoration of solidarity with as little friction as possible.
Better than most Union leaders he appreciated conditions in the South, the problem of the races, the weakness of the Southern Unionists, and the advantage of calling in the old Southern leaders.He was generous and considerate; he wanted no executions or imprisonments; he wished the leaders to escape; and he was anxious that the mass of Southerners be welcomed back without loss of rights."There is," he declared, "too little respect for their rights," an unwillingness, in short, to treat them as fellow citizens.
This executive policy had been applied from the beginning of the war as opportunity offered.The President used the army to hold the Border States in the Union, to aid in "reorganizing" Unionist Virginia and in establishing West Virginia.The army, used to preserve the Union might be used also to restore disturbed parts of it to normal condition.Assuming that the "States" still existed, "loyal" state governments were the first necessity.By his proclamation of December 8, 1863, Lincoln suggested a method of beginning the reconstruction: he would pardon any Confederate, except specified classes of leaders, who took an oath of loyalty for the future; if as many as ten percent of the voting population of 1860, thus made loyal, should establish a state government the executive would recognize it.The matter of slavery must, indeed, be left to the laws and proclamations as interpreted by the courts, but other institutions should continue as in 1861.
