The development of intelligence is, under one of its chief aspects, aclassifying of the unlike things previously confounded together -- a formationof sub-classes and sub-sub-classes, until the once confused aggregate ofobjects known, is resolved into an aggregate which unites great heterogeneityamong its multiplied groups, with complete homogeneity among the membersof each group. On following through ascending grades of creatures, the genesisof that vast structure of knowledge acquired by sight, we see that in thefirst stage, where eye-specks suffice only for discriminating light fromdarkness, there can be no classifications of objects seen, save those basedon the manner in which light is obstructed, and the degree in which it isobstructed. By such undeveloped visual organs, the shadows perceived wouldbe merely distinguished into those of the stationary objects which the creaturepassed during its own movements, and those of the moving objects which camenear while it was at rest; so that the extremely general classification ofvisible things into stationary and moving, would be the earliest formed.
A kindred step follows. While the simplest eyes cannot distinguish betweenan obstruction of light caused by a small object close to, and an obstructioncaused by a large object at some distance, eyes a little more developed candistinguish them; whence must result a vague differentiation of the classof moving objects into the nearer and the more remote. Further developmentswhich make possible a better estimation of distances by adjustment of theoptic axes, and those which, through enlargement and subdivision of the retina,make possible the discrimination of shapes, must give greater definitenessto the classes already formed, and subdivide these into smaller classes,consisting of objects less unlike. In every infant may be traced the analogoustransformation of a confused aggregate of impressions of surrounding things,not recognized as differing in their distances, sizes, and shapes, into separateclasses of things unlike one another in these and various other respects.
And in both cases the change from this first indefinite, incoherent, andcomparatively homogeneous consciousness, to a definite, coherent, and heterogeneousone, is due to differences in the actions of incident forces on the organism.
These brief indications must suffice. Probably they will give adequate clueto an argument by which each reader may satisfy himself that the course ofmental evolution offers no exception to the general law. In further aid ofsuch an argument, I will here add an illustration which is comprehensibleapart from the process of mental evolution as a whole.
It has been remarked (I am told by Coleridge) that with the advance oflanguage, words which were originally alike in their meanings acquire unlikemeanings -- a change he expressed by the formidable word "de-synonymization."Among indigenous words this loss of equivalence cannot be clearly shown;because in them the divergences of meaning began before the dawn of literature.
But among words that have been coined, or adopted from other languages, sincethe writing of books commenced, it is demonstrable. By the old divines, miscreantwas used in its etymological sense of unbeliever; but in modern speech ithas entirely lost this sense. Similarly with evil-doer and malefactor. Exactlysynonymous as these are by derivation, they are no longer synonymous by usage.
By a malefactor we now under stand a convicted criminal, which is far frombeing the acceptation of evil-doer. The verb produce bears in Euclid itsprimary meaning -- to prolong or draw out; but the now largely-developedmeanings of produce, have little in common with the meanings of prolong,or draw out. In the Church of England liturgy an odd effect now results fromthe occurrence of prevent in its original sense -- to come before, insteadof its modern specialized sense -- to come before with the effect of arresting.
But the most conclusive cases are those in which the contrasted words consistof the same parts differently combined, as in go under and undergo. We gounder a tree, and we undergo a pain. But though, if analytically considered,the meanings would be the same were the words transposed, habit has so farmodified their meanings that we could not without absurdity speak of undergoinga tree and going under a pain. Many such instances show that between twowords which are originally of like force, an equilibrium cannot be maintained.
Unless they are daily used in exactly equal degrees, in exactly similar relations(which is infinitely improbable), there necessarily aries a habit of associatingone rather than the other with particular acts, or objects. Such a habitonce commenced, becomes confirmed; and gradually their homogeneity of meaningdisappears.
Should any difficulty be felt in understanding how these mental changesexemplify a law of physical transformations that are wrought by physicalforces, it will disappear on contemplating acts of mind as nervous functions.
It will be seen that each loss of equilibrium above instanced, is a lossof functional equality between some two elements of the nervous system. Andit will be seen that, as in other cases, this loss of functional equalityis due to differences in the incidence of forces. §154. Masses of men, in common with all other masses, show a likeproclivity similarly caused. Small combinations and large societies equallymanifest it; and in the one, as in the other, both governmental and industrialdifferentiations are initiated by it. Let us glance at the facts under theseheads.
A business-partnership, balanced as the authorities of its members maytheoretically be, presently becomes a union in which the authority of onepartner is tacitly recognized as greater than that of the other or others.
