That Mr. Lincoln contemplated the ultimate and not remote enfranchisement of the late slaves, is manifest from his suggestion to Gov. Hahn, of Louisiana, hereinbefore quoted in connection with the then approaching Convention for the re-establishment of State Government there, and again still more manifest from his last public utterance on April 11, 1865, deprecating the rejection by Congress of his plan for the restoration of Louisiana, in which, he said, speaking of that action by Congress rejecting the Louisiana bill: "Grant that the colored male desires the elective franchise. He will attain it sooner by saving the already advanced steps towards it than by running back over them."It is also apparent in the light of the succeeding history of that time and of that question, that if Mr. Lincoln's views had been seconded by Congress, the enfranchisement of the negro would have been, though delayed, as certain of accomplishment, and of a vastly higher and more satisfactory plane--and the country saved the years of friction and disgraceful public disorder that characterized the enforcement of the Congressional plan afterwards adopted.
As to the success of Mr. Lincoln's plans, had they been sanctioned, or even had they not been repudiated by Congress, Mr.
Blaine, in his book, asserts that Mr. Lincoln, "By his four years of considerate and successful administration, by his patient and positive trust in the ultimate triumph of the Union, realized at last as he stood upon the edge of the grave--he had acquired so complete an ascendancy over the public, control in the loyal states, that ANY POLICY MATURED AND ANNOUNCED BY HIM WOULD HAVEBEEN ACCEPTED BY A VAST MAJORITY OF HIS COUNTRYMEN."It was indicative of the sagacious foresight of Mr. Lincoln that he did not call the Congress into special session at the close of the war, as would have been natural and usual, before attempting the establishment of any method for the restoration of the revolted States. The fact that he did not do so, but was making preparations to proceed immediately in that work on his own lines and in accordance with his own ideas, and with the hearty accord of his entire Cabinet, of itself affords proof that he was apprehensive of obstruction from the same element of his party that subsequently arose in opposition to Mr. Johnson on that question, and that he preferred to put his plans into operation before the assembling of Congress in the next regular winter session, in order that he might be able then to show palpable results, and induce Congress to accept and follow up a humane, peaceful and satisfactory system of reconstruction. Mr. Lincoln undoubtedly hoped thus to avoid unnecessary friction. Having the quite unlimited confidence of the great mass of the people of the country, of both parties and on both sides of the line of hostilities, there seem to be excellent reasons for believing that he would have succeeded, and that the extraordinary and exasperating differences and local turmoils that followed the drastic measures which were afterward adopted by Congress over the President's vetoes, would have been in a very large degree avoided, and THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO IMPEACHMENT--either of Mr.
Lincoln had he lived, or of Mr. Johnson after him.
It was the misfortune of the time, and of the occasion, which determined Mr. Lincoln to institute a plan of restoration during the interim of Congress, that the Republican party, then in absolute control of Congress, was in no sense equipped for such a work. Its first and great mission had been the destruction of slavery. Though not phrased in formal fashion, that was the logic of its creation and existence. It was brought into being purely as an anti-slavery party, illustrated in the fact that its membership included every pronounced anti-slavery man, known as abolitionists, in the United States. All its energies, during all its life up to the close of the war had been bent to that end. It had been born and bred to the work of destruction. It came to destroy slavery, and its forces had been nurtured, to the last day of the war, in pulling down--in fact, did not then wholly cease.
The work of restoration--the rebuilding of fallen States--had now come. The Republican party approached that work in the hot blood of war and the elation of victory--a condition illy fitting the demands of exalted statesmanship so essential to perfect political effort.
Never had nation or party thrust upon it a more delicate duty or graver responsibility. It was that of leading a conquered people to build a new civilization wholly different from the one in ruins. It was first to reconcile two races totally different from each other, so far as possible to move in harmony in supplanting servile by free labor, and the slave by a free American citizen.
The transition was sudden, and the elements antagonistic in race, culture, self-governing power--indeed, in all the qualities which characterize a free people.
There was a wide margin for honest differences between statesmen of experience. A universal sentiment could not obtain. The accepted political leaders of the time were illy equipped to meet the issue--much less those who had been brought to prominence, and too often to control, in the hot blood of war and the frictions of the time, when intemperate denunciation and a free use of the epithets of "rebel," and "traitor," had become a ready passport to public honors. It was a time when the admonition to make haste slowly was of profound significance. A peril greater than any other the civil war had developed, overhung the nation.
Greater than ever the demand for courage in conciliation--for divesting the issues of all mere partyism, and the yielding of something by the extremes, both of conservatism and radicalism.
