Distinction， also， is apt to go with an exaggerated self-consciousness little favorable to a natural and heart (139) participation in the deeper currents of the general life. Ambition and the passion for difference are good in their way， but like most good things they are bought at a price， in this case a preoccupation with ideas that separate one from immediate fellowship. It is right to have high and unusual aims and activities， but hard to keep them free from pride， mistrust， gloom and other vices of isolation. Only a very sane mind can carry distinction and fellowship without spilling either.
In the social regard paid to wealth and standing we symbolize our vague sense of the value of personal faculty working in the service of the whole， but it requires an unusual purity and depth of social feeling for the possessor of faculty not to be demoralized by this regard， which is？perhaps necessarily梐lmost disassociated from definite and cogent responsibility. I mean that the eminent usually get the credit of virtue as it were ex officio whether they really have it or not. We find therefore that power， instead of being simply higher service， is generally more or less corrupt or selfish， and those who are raised up are so much the more cast down. At the best they make some sacrifice of innocence to function； at the worst they destroy themselves and debauch society.
Even vulgarity (by etymology the vice of the crowd) if we take it to mean undisciplined selfishness and pretension， flourishes at least as much among the prosperous as among the hardworking people. Wealth which is not dominated by noble tradition or by rare personal inspiration falls into vulgarity because it permits the inflation of those crude impulses which are much kept down in the poor by the discipline of hardship. Whatever is severely (140) necessary can never be vulgar， while only nobleness can prevent the superfluous from being so. And a superficial， functionless education and refinement is nearly as vulgar as uninspired wealth. So it has been remarked that when artists paint our contemporary life they are apt to choose it as humble as possible in order " to get down below the strata which vulgarity permeates." [9]
Moreover， conspicuous and successful persons are more likely than the commonalty to be institutionized， to have sacrificed human nature to speciality.
To succeed in the hour one must be a man of the hour， and must ordinarily harness his very soul to some sort of contemporary activity which may after all be of no real worth. An upper class is institutional in its very essence， since it is control of institutions that makes it an upper class， and men can hardly keep this control except as they put their hearts into it. Successful business men， lawyers， politicians， clergymen， editors and the like are such through identifying their minds， for better or worse， with the present activities and ideals of commercial and other institutions. " Seldom does the new conscience， when it seeks a teacher to declare to men what is wrong， find him in the dignitaries of the church， the state， the culture， that is. The higher the rank the closer the tie that binds those to what is but ought not to be. [10]
The humbler classes are somewhat less entangled in spirit. It is better to have the hand subdued to what it works in than the soul； and the mechanic who sells to the (141) times only his ten hours a day of muscular work is perhaps more free to think humanly the rest of the time than his employer. He can also more easily keep the habit of simple look and speech， since he does not have to learn to collecal his thoughts in the same degree that the lawyer， the merchant and the statesman do. Even among students I have observed， in the matter of openness of countenance， a marked difference， on the whole， between the graduates of an engineering school and those of a law school， very much in favor of the former. [11] Again， the hand laborer is used to reckoning his wages by the hour？so much time so much pay梐nd would feel dishonest if he did anything else. But in the professions， and still more in commerce and finance， there is， as a rule， no definite measure of service， and men insensibly come to base their charges on their view of what the other man will pay； thus perilously accustoming themselves to exploit the wealth or weakness of others.
The life of special institutions is often transient in proportion to its speciality， and it is only natural that commercial and professional activity should deal largely with evanescent interests of little dignity in themselves. The "demand" of the public which the merchant has to meet， is in great part a thing of vanity， if not of degradation， which it can hardly be edifying to supply. Indeed， many， if not most， business men play their occupation as a game， rather than in a spirit of service， and are widely infected by the fallacy that they are justified in selling anything (142) that the people will buy. Simple minds are revolted by the lack of tangible human service in many of the higher paid occupations， and young men enter them for the pay alone when their better impulses would lead them to prefer hand labor.
The sentiment of the people is most readily and successfully exercised in their judgment of persons. Montesquieu， in discussing republican government， advocated on this ground an almost universal manhood suffrage in the choosing of representatives. " For，" says he， " though few can tell the exact degree of men's capacities， yet there are none but are capable of knowing in general whether the person they choose is better qualified than most of his neighbors." [12] The plainest men have an inbred shrewdness in judging human nature which makes them good critics of persons even when impenetrable to ideas. This shrewdness is fostered by a free society， in which every one has to make and hold his own place among his fellows； and it is used with much effect in politics and elsewhere as a guide to sound ideas.
