'Et eciam comperto in libro de Domesday quod non fit aliqua mencio de sokemannis set tantummodo de villanis et servis et eciam comperto per inquisicionem quod multi eorum sunt adventicii quibus tenementa sua tradita fuerunt ad voluntatem dominorum suorum... consideraverunt quod predictus Galfridus eat inde sine die et quod predicti homines teneant tenementa predicta in predicto manerio per servilia servicia si voluerint, salvo statu corporum suorum, et quod de cetero non possunt clamare aliquod certum statum et sint in misericordia pro falso clameo.'
101. Bract. Note-book, pl. 1227.
102. Bracton, f. 7.
103. Dialogus de Scaccario, i. 10: 'Post regni conquisitionem, post justam rebellium subversionem, cum rex ipse regisque proceres loca nova perlustrarent, facta est inquisitio diligens, qui fuerint qui contra regem in bello dimicantes per fugam Se salvaverint. His omnibus et item haeredibus eorum qui in bello occubuerunt, spes omnis terrarum et fundorum atque redituum, quos ante possederant, praeclusa est; magnum namque reputabant frui vitae beneficio sub inimicis. Verum qui vocati ad bellum nec dum convenerant, vel familiaribus vel quibuslibet necessariis occupati negotiis non interfuerant, cum tractu temporis devotis obsequiis gratiam dominorum possedissent, sine spe successionis, sibi tantum pro voluptate (voluntate?) tamen dominorum possidere coeperunt. Succedente vero tempore cum dominis suis odiosi passim a possessionibus pellerentur, nec esset qui ablata restitueret, communis indigenarum ad regem pervenit querimonia, quasi sic omnibus exosi et rebus spoliati ad alienigenas transire cogerentur. Communicato tandem super his consilio, decretum est, ut quod a dominis suis exigentibus meritis interveniente pactione legitima poterant obtinere, illis inviolabili jure concederentur;ceterum autem nomine successionis a temporibus subactae gentis nihil sibi vendicarent.'
104. Stoneleigh Reg., 4 a: 'Que quidem maneria existencia in possessione et manu domini regis Edwardi per universum regnum vocantur antiquumn dominicum corone regis Anglie prout in libro de Domesdav continetur.'
105. 'Loquebantur de tempore Sti Edwardi Regis coram W. de Wilton.'
106. The men of King's Ripton.
107. I do not think there is any ground for the suggestion thrown out by M. Kovalevsky in the Law Quarterly, iv. p. 271, namely, that the law of ancient demesne was imported from Normandy.
Whatever the position of the villains was in the Duchy, Norman influence in England made for subjection, because it was the influence of conquest. It must be remembered that in a sense the feudal law of England was the hardest of all in Western Europe, and this on account of the invasion.
108. Stubbs, Const. Hist. I. 454: 'In those estates, which, when they had been held by the crown since the reign of Edward the Confessor, bore the title of manors in ancient demesne, very much of the ancient popular process had been preserved without any change, and to the present day some customs are maintained in them which recall the most primitive institutions.' I shall have to speak about the mode of holding the courts in another chapter.
Legal Aspect of Villainage. Conclusions I have been trying to make out what the theories of the lawyers were with regard to villainage in its divers ramifications. Were we to consider this legal part of the subject merely as a sort of crust superposed artificially over the reality of social facts, we should have to break through the crust in order to get at the reality. But, of course, the law regulating social conditions is not merely an external superstructure, but as to social facts is both an influence and a consequence. In one sense it is a most valuable product of the forces at play in the history of society, most valuable just by reason of the requirements of its formalism and of those theoretical tendencies which give a very definite even if a somewhat distorted shape to the social processes which come within its sphere of action.
The formal character of legal theory is not only important because it puts things into order and shape; it suggests a peculiar and efficient method of treating the historical questions connected with law. The legal intellect is by its calling and nature always engaged in analysing complex cases into constitutive elements, and bringing these elements under the direction of principles. It is constantly struggling with the confusing variety of life, and from the historian's point of view it is most interesting when it succumbs in the struggle. There is no law, however subtle and comprehensive, which does not exhibit on its logical surface seams and scars, testifying to the incomplete fusing together of doctrines that cannot be brought under the cover of one principle. And so a dialectic examination of legal forms which makes manifest the contradictions and confused notions they contain actually helps us to an insight into the historical stratification of ideas and facts, a stratification which cannot be abolished however much lawyers may crave for unity and logic.
