Following the same line of thought, the owner of cattle is not held absolutely answerable for all damage which they may do the person.According to Lord Holt in the alcove opinion, these animals, "which are not so familiar to mankind" as dogs, "the owner ought to confine, and take all reasonable caution that they do no mischief....But...if the owner puts a horse or an ox to grass in his field, which is adjoining to the highway, and the horse or the ox breaks the hedge and runs into the highway, and kicks or gores some passenger, an action will not lie against the owner; otherwise, if he had notice that they had done such a thing before." Perhaps the most striking authority for the position that the judge's duties are not at an end when the question of negligence is reached, is shown by the discussions concerning the law of bailment.Consider the judgment in Coggs v.Bernard, the treatises of Sir William Jones and Story, and the chapter of Kent upon the subject.They are so many attempts to state the duty of the bailee specifically, according to the nature of the bailment and of the object bailed.Those attempts, to be sure, were not successful, partly because they were attempts to engraft upon the native stock a branch of the Roman law which was too large to survive the process, but more especially because the distinctions attempted were purely qualitative, and were therefore useless when dealing with a jury. To instruct a jury that they must find the defendant guilty of gross negligence before he can be charged, is open to the reproach that for such a body the word "gross" is only a vituperative epithet.But it would not be so with a judge sitting in admiralty without a jury.
The Roman law and the Supreme Court of the United States agree that the word means something. Successful or not, it is enough for the present argument that the attempt has been made.
The principles of substantive law which have been established by the courts are believed to have been somewhat obscured by having presented themselves oftenest in the form of rulings upon the sufficiency of evidence.When a judge rules that there is no evidence of negligence, he does something more than is embraced in an ordinary ruling that there is no evidence of a fact.He rules that acts or omissions proved or in question do not constitute a ground of legal liability, and in this way the law is gradually enriching itself from daily life, as it should.
Thus, in Crafton v.Metropolitan Railway Co., the plaintiff slipped on the defendant's stairs and was severely hurt.The cause of his slipping was that the brass nosing of the stairs had been worn smooth by travel over it, and a builder testified that in his opinion the staircase was unsafe by reason of this circumstance and the absence of a hand-rail.There was nothing to contradict this except that great numbers of persons had passed over the stairs and that no accident had happened there, and the plaintiff had a verdict.The court set the verdict aside, and ordered a nonsuit.The ruling was in form that there was no evidence of negligence to go to the jury; but this was obviously equivalent to saying, and did in fact mean, that the railroad company had done all that it was bound to do in maintaining such a staircase as was proved by the plaintiff.A hundred other equally concrete instances will be found in the text-books.
On the other hand, if the court should rule that certain acts or omissions coupled with damage were conclusive evidence of negligence unless explained, it would, in substance and in truth, rule that such acts or omissions were a ground of liability, or prevented a recovery, as the case might be.Thus it is said to be actionable negligence to let a house for a dwelling knowing it to be so infected with small-pox as to be dangerous to health, and concealing the knowledge. To explain the acts or omissions in such a case would be to prove different conduct from that ruled upon, or to show that they were not, juridically speaking, the cause of the damage complained of.The ruling assumes, for the purposes of the ruling, that the facts in evidence are all the facts.
The cases which have raised difficulties needing explanation are those in which the court has ruled that there was prima facie evidence of negligence, or some evidence of negligence to go to the jury.
Many have noticed the confusion of thought implied in speaking of such cases as presenting mixed questions of law and fact.No doubt, as has been said above, the averment that the defendant has been guilty of negligence is a complex one: first, that he has done or omitted certain things; second, that his alleged conduct does not come up to the legal standard.And so long as the controversy is simply on the first half, the whole complex averment is plain matter for the jury without special instructions, just as a question of ownership would be where the only dispute was as to the fact upon which the legal conclusion was founded. But when a controversy arises on the second half, the question whether the court or the jury ought to judge of the defendant's conduct is wholly unaffected by the accident, whether there is or is not also a dispute as to what that conduct was.If there is such a dispute, it is entirely possible to give a series of hypothetical instructions adapted to every state of facts which it is open to the jury to find.If there is no such dispute, the court may still take their opinion as to the standard.The problem is to explain the relative functions of court and jury with regard to the latter.
