But what is the quality in actions looked at, appreciated, and {80} approved by the moral sense? To this question Hutcheson gives, if not a satisfactory, a very decisive reply.He represents this quality as good-will or benevolence." All those kind affections which incline us to make others happy, and all actions which flow from such affections, appear morally good, if while they are benevolent towards some persons they be not pernicious to others." Advancing, a step farther, he discovers that "the several affections which are approved, though in very different degrees, yet all agree in one general character of tendency to the happiness of others," and the most perfectly virtuous actions are such " as appear to have the most unlimited tendency to the greatest and most extensive happiness of all the rational agents to whom our influence can reach." He is evidently inclined to reckon the moral sense as planted in our nature to lead us to commend at once those actions which tend towards the general happiness.His theory of virtue thus comes to be an exalted kind of eudaimonism, with God giving us a moral sense to approve of the promotion of happiness without our discovering the consequences of actions.Hume required only to leave out the divine sanction (he retained some sort of moral sense) in order to reach his theory of virtue consisting in the useful and agreeable.Hutcheson opposes very resolutely all those moralists who seek to give morality a deeper foundation in the nature of things.The function of reason in morals is simply to show what external actions are laudable or censurable, according as they evidence good or evil affections of soul.
Proceeding on these principles, derived mainly from Shaftesbury, but more systematically expounded, he builds up a system of moral philosophy.He gives a division of the virtues, and treats of the duties we owe toward God, toward mankind, and toward ourselves.In proving the existence of God, he appeals to the structure of the world.He reaches the divine perfections by a set of metaphysical principles surreptitiously introduced, and scarcely consistent with his philosophy.{81} He answers the objections derived from the existence of evil in a commonplace way, by showing how particular evils are necessary to superior good.He seeks to establish the immortality of the soul by an appeal to the nature of the soul as being different from the body, and to the hopes of a future state.
He enters at great length into the discussion of the ages which preceded him, as to the law of nature.He shows that there are rights antecedent to the institution of civil government.He establishes the right of property, first, on the principle that " things fit for present use the first occupier should enjoy undisturbed; " and on the farther principle, that each has a right to the fruits of his own labor, and that it is the common interest of society, and tends towards the furtherance of industry, that mankind should be secured in their possessions.
He says that "civil power is most naturally founded by these three different acts of a whole people: (1) An agreement or contract of each one with all the rest, that they will unite into one society or body, to be governed in all their common interests by one council; (2) A decree or designation made by the whole people of the form or plan of power and of the persons to be intrusted with it; (3) Amutual agreement or contract between the governors thus constituted and the people, the former obliging themselves to a faithful administration of the powers vested in them for the common interest, and the latter obliging themselves to obedience.Though it is not probable that, in the constitution of the several states, men have generally taken these three regular steps; yet it is plain that, in every just constitution of power, there is some such transaction as implicitly contains the whole force of all the three." He argues that the people have a right of resistance, and of dethroning a prince who is grossly perfidious to his trust.
