But Hutcheson dwells far more on the motive and moral parts of man's nature than on logical and metaphysical subjects.We have seen that he brings in many other senses besides the external ones.He defines sense, " every determination of our minds to receive ideas independently on our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain." The following is his classification of them: " (1) In the first class are the external senses, universally known.(2) In the second, the pleasant perceptions arising from regular harmonious uniform objects, as also from grandeur and novelty.These we may call, after Mr.Addison, the `pleasures of the imagination,' or we may call the power of receiving them an internal sense.Whoever dislikes this name may substitute another.(3) The next class of perceptions we may call a public sense; viz., our determination to be pleased with the happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their misery.This is found in some degree in all men, and was sometimes called , or <sensus commnunis>, by the ancients; this inward pain or compassion cannot be called a sensation of sight.It solely arises from an opinion of misery felt by another, and not immediately from a visible form.The same form presented to the eye by the exactest painting, or the action of a player, gives no pain to those who remember that' there is no misery felt.When men by imagination conceive real pain felt by an actor, without recollecting that it is merely {76} feigned, or when they think of the real story represented, then, as there is a confused opinion of real misery, there is also pain in compassion.(4) The fourth class we may call the moral sense, by which we perceive virtue or vice in ourselves or others.This is plainly distinct from the former class of perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the fortunes of others who seldom reflect upon virtue or vice in themselves or others as an object; as we may find in natural affection, compassion, friendship, or even general benevolence to mankind, which connect our happiness or pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own temper, nor delighted with the perception of our own virtue.(5) The fifth class is a sense of honor which makes the approbation or gratitude of others, for any good actions we have done, the necessary occasion of pleasure, and then dislike, condemnation, or resentment of injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy sensation called shame, even when we fear no further evil from them."He adds that this enumeration may not be sufficient, and says that "there may be others, such as some ideas of decency, dignity, suitableness to human nature in certain actions and circumstances."He then shows that the objects gratifying these senses call forth desires, which fall into five corresponding classes, those of the bodily senses, of the imagination or internal sense, of public happiness, of virtue, and honor.
We are yet (so I am inclined to think) without a thoroughly exhaustive classification of the natural appetencies which lead to emotion, and desire, and action.That of Hutcheson is one of the best which we yet have, and should be looked to by those who would draw out a scheme of the categories of man's motive principles.I am disposed to think, however, that the sense of honor may be resolved into the moral sense combined with some other principles.(" Moral Philosophy,"Book I.)
He shows how secondary grow upon these original desires."Since we are capable of reflection, memory, observation, and reasoning about the distant tendencies of objects and actions, and not confined to things present, there must arise, in consequence of our <original desires, secondary desires> of every thing imagined useful to gratify any of the primary desires, and that {77} with strength proportioned to the several original desires and the imagined usefulness or necessity of the advantageous object.
Thus, as soon as we come to apprehend the use Of wealth or power to gratify any of our original desires we must also desire them.Hence arises the universality of these desires of wealth and power, since they are the means of gratifying all other desires." Mackintosh says, " He seems to have been the first who entertained just nations of the formation of the secondary desires which had been overlooked by Butler."("Passions," Sect.I.Mackintosh's " Diss.," Sect.V.)He also shows how the association of ideas, which he characterizes as the "disposition in our nature to associate any ideas together for the future which once presented themselves jointly," has an influence upon our desires, primary and secondary, and specially on our sense of beauty.
